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As suggested by the title of her new book, Reshaping the Work-
Family Debate: Why Men and Class Matter, Joan Williams takes class 
seriously. Class matters, Williams argues, because “socially conscious 
progressives”1 need political allies to achieve progress with their agenda 
for work-family reform.2 Williams calls us not only to think about class 
and recognize it as a significant axis of stratification and (dis)advantage, 
but also to treat the working class with respect and dignity. Emblematic 
of Williams’s argument is her challenge to us to “[d]iscard[] Marxian 
analyses from 30,000 feet” and “come down to learn enough about work-
ing-class life to end decades of casual insults.”3 In other words, be nice 
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 1. JOAN C. WILLIAMS, RESHAPING THE WORK-FAMILY DEBATE: WHY MEN AND CLASS 
MATTER 152 (2010). She also refers to this group as the “reform-minded elite.” Id. at 160, 211. Most 
socially conscious progressives are within the class that Williams labels “professional-managerial.” 
Id. at 156, 163; see also infra notes 15–19. 
 2. See, e.g., id. at 211 (“A precondition for permanent political change is a changed relation-
ship between the white working-class and the reform-minded elite.”). 
 3. Id. at 212. 
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and play fair. It’s a tried-and-true way to win friends and influence 
people. 
In this Essay, I seek to enhance Williams’s powerful and pathbreak-
ing discussion of the white working class in three ways. Part I brings 
geography explicitly into consideration by arguing that the culture 
wars—which I believe Williams aligns correctly along a broad and fuzzy 
line between the working class and the professional-managerial class—
similarly align along the rural–urban axis. Just as liberal elites shun and 
ridicule the white working class,4 they similarly express disdain for rural 
and small-town residents.5 Indeed, among denizens of the largest cities 
and “coastal elites,” rural Americans have become a proxy for the work-
ing class—the uncouth, the uncultured, and—yes—the illiberal.6 I con-
                                                     
 4. See id. at 154; see also JOE BAGEANT, DEER HUNTING WITH JESUS: DISPATCHES FROM 
AMERICA’S CLASS WAR 103 (2007); JENNIFER SHERMAN, THOSE WHO WORK, THOSE WHO DON’T: 
POVERTY, MORALITY, AND FAMILY IN RURAL AMERICA 181 (2009). 
 5. See infra Part I. I use the terms “rural,” “small-town,” and “nonmetropolitan” interchangea-
bly in this Essay, although I am more precisely referring to places that might be seen as culturally 
rural or that the U.S. government labels “nonmetropolitan,” which is a county-level designation for 
counties with fewer than 100,000 residents and no urban cluster larger than 50,000. Metropolitan 
and Micropolitan Statistical Areas, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (last updated Aug. 19, 2008), http://www. 
census.gov/population/www/metroareas/metroarea.html. The Census Bureau has, since 1910, de-
fined “rural” as open countryside and places with fewer than 2,500 residents. John Cromartie & 
Shawn Bucholtz, Defining the “Rural” in Rural America, AMBER WAVES, 28, 31 (June 2008), 
available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/AmberWaves/June08/PDF/RuralAmerica.pdf (describing the 
variety of ways in which the federal government defines “rural”). According to the 2000 census, 
25.7 million “rural” residents, about half of all rural residents, live in “metropolitan” areas by virtue 
of being in a metro county. Geographic Comparison Table, Urban/Rural and Metropoli-
tan/Nonmetropolitan Population: 2000, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2000), http://factfinder.census.gov 
(follow “Get Data” hyperlink under Decennial Census; then follow “Geographic Comparison 
Tables” hyperlink under “Census 2000 Summary File 1 (SF 1) 100-Percent Data”; then select “Unit-
ed States—Urban/Rural and Inside/Outside Metropolitan Area”); see also Jennifer Bradley & Bruce 
Katz, Village Idiocy: Enough with Small-Town Triumphalism, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 8, 2008. These 
“rural” residents are less likely to be culturally rural or to experience the sorts of service deprivations 
associated with more traditional rural populations in nonmetropolitan counties; see also Briefing 
Rooms: Measuring Rurality: What is Rural?, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. ECON. RESEARCH SERV. (Mar. 
22, 2007), http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/Rurality/WhatIsRural (explaining new definitions of 
urban/rural and metro/nonmetro); Lisa R. Pruitt, Gender, Geography & Rural Justice, 23 BERKELEY 
J. GENDER L. & JUST. 338, 343–48 (2008) (discussing the contested nature of the rural). 
Further, when I refer in this Essay to rural, small-town, and nonmetropolitan, I’m specifically ex-
cluding nonmetropolitan college towns, where politics tends to be more progressive, as well as rural 
resorts and other examples of rural gentrification. See Lawrence C. Hamilton et al., Place Matters: 
Challenges and Opportunities in Four Rural Americas, 1 REP. ON RURAL AM. 1, 6 (2008), available 
at http://www.carseyinstitute.unh.edu/publications/Report_PlaceMatters.pdf (articulating a four-part 
taxonomy of rural places, including one labeled “amenity-rich”); “rural gentrification” label, 
LEGAL RURALISM BLOG, (Feb. 28, 2011, 10:59 AM), http://legalruralism.blogspot.com/search/label/ 
rural%20gentrification. 
 6. Indeed, the relevance of geography to class-bashing is suggested by authors like Thomas 
Frank, whose book, What’s the Matter with Kansas?, Williams criticizes as “paint[ing] a picture of 
workers too dim-witted to recognize they are being manipulated by the capitalist class.” WILLIAMS, 
supra note 1, at 212. The relevance of geography to law and policy-making is suggested by a recent 
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tend that social progressives reserve their greatest contempt—and increa-
singly also their ire—for whites in rural America, the vast majority of 
whom are working class.7 
Based on this argument that the opposing sides in the class culture 
wars are now represented, broadly speaking, by the rural and the urban, I 
take up three other issues. First, in Part II, I disrupt Williams’s broad-
brush class dichotomy—“professional-managerial” and “working 
class”—by introducing other classes and subclasses that are particularly 
relevant in rural contexts. Specifically, I show how Williams’s implicitly 
metropolitan class taxonomy parallels a similar divide in nonmetropoli-
tan communities, and I discuss the role of morality as a basis for diffe-
rentiation among factions of the white working class in both types of set-
tings. Then, in Part III, I argue that cultural and political disdain for rural 
folks prevents law and policy-makers from seeing and addressing the 
distinct challenges facing the rural citizenry—including those associated 
with work-life security. I conclude in Part IV with thoughts on what 
might provide common ground between the professional-managerial 
class and the white working class—ground that could provide a bridge of 
understanding that would permit political détente and, ultimately, coop-
eration. 
My thoughts about Joan Williams’s book and the class culture wars 
are informed by my own rural upbringing,8 as well as my status as a 
“class migrant,” which Williams defines as “individuals born and raised 
working class, who join the upper-middle class through access to elite 
education.”9 In addition, my comments and analysis rely heavily on two 
sources—one conventional, the other not—that complement Williams’s 
fine work. First, I draw on Jennifer Sherman’s 2009 book, Those Who 
Work, Those Who Don’t: Poverty, Morality, and Family in Rural Ameri-
ca.10 This book provides a rural-specific counterpart and complement to 
                                                                                                                       
book on family law. NAOMI CAHN & JUNE CARBONE, RED FAMILIES V. BLUE FAMILIES: LEGAL 
POLARIZATION AND THE CREATION OF CULTURE (2010) (calling geography a guiding principle of 
the book); see also BILL BISHOP, THE BIG SORT: WHY THE CLUSTERING OF LIKE-MINDED AMERICA 
IS TEARING US APART (2008) (discussing the relevance of geography to culture and politics and 
arguing that Americans increasingly move to places so that they can be with others who share their 
political views and are in other ways similar). 
 7. Indeed, I am not convinced that liberal elites’ disdain extends to the working-class folks in 
their midst. In my experience, social progressives tend to be relatively compassionate and respectful 
of workers with whom they have face-to-face, day-to-day contact. 
 8. See Lisa R. Pruitt, Rural Rhetoric, 39 CONN. L. REV. 159, 165 (2006) [hereinafter Pruitt, 
Rural Rhetoric]; Lisa R. Pruitt, How You Gonna’ Keep Her Down on the Farm . . ., 78 UMKC L. 
REV. 1085 (2010) [hereinafter Pruitt, How You Gonna’ Keep Her Down on the Farm . . .]. 
 9. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 154. A partial account of my class migration was published as 
Pruitt, How You Gonna’ Keep Her Down on the Farm . . ., supra note 8. For another tale of class 
migration, see Laura T. Kessler, Feminism for Everyone, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 679, 697 (2011). 
 10. SHERMAN, supra note 4. 
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Williams’s more generalized explanation of why morality and family—
and therefore cultural issues more broadly—are so important to the white 
working class.11 The second, rather unorthodox source is journalist Joe 
Bageant’s 2007 book, Deer Hunting with Jesus: Dispatches from Ameri-
ca’s Class War.12 Bageant’s insights as a cultural critic—though articu-
lated in a sharper tone and with a more anecdotal method—are uncannily 
similar to those that Williams and Sherman document in academic fa-
shion. Finally, I illustrate how President Obama has endorsed the core 
ideas of all three authors. 
I. CULTURE WARS ACROSS THE RURAL–URBAN AXIS 
In two marvelous chapters, “The Class Culture Gap” and “Culture 
Wars as Class Conflict,” Williams provides a primer on class, discussing 
how it may be identified and measured, and presenting data on educa-
tion, income levels, and occupation.13 More significantly, she synthesizes 
every major ethnography of the white working class in the late-twentieth-
century United States, thereby serving up for the reader a composite por-
trait of this milieu. In doing so, Williams touches on a wide array of cul-
tural manifestations of class, from how we raise our children, to our lei-
sure pursuits, to what we eat, to our attitudes about religion.14 Williams’s 
analysis is based on two broad classes, which she labels the “working 
class” and the “professional-managerial class.” In comparing and con-
trasting the tastes and folkways of these two classes, Williams makes the 
point that the professional-managerial class—no less than their working-
class counterparts—wear their culture on their proverbial sleeves: “Our 
understated clothes, educational travel, and our teeny tiny portions of 
                                                     
 11. It is worth noting that working-class white voters probably also see socially conscious 
progressives as unduly attached to cultural issues such as same-sex marriage and the death penalty—
but, of course, on the opposing sides of these issues from the working class. 
 12. Joe Bageant’s perspective is also that of a class migrant. He writes: 
In the course of that circuitous journey between leaving Winchester, penniless and dumb-
er than tree bark, and returning at age fifty-three, a modestly successful journalist and 
editor, I am now approximately a member of the middle class and one of the liberals at 
whom I so often poke fun. But a person’s roots do not disappear just because he or she 
managed to narrowly cross the class lines that the American national story line claims do 
not exist. And what I see is that my people, the working folks in the old neighborhood—
though they own more electronic gadgets and newer cars—are faring worse than when I 
left in quality of life and basic security. 
BAGEANT, supra note 4, at 6. 
 13. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 155–56. 
 14. Id. at 151–214. Williams is hardly the first to link class to the culture wars. See, e.g., Mar-
tha T. McCluskey, How Equality Became Elitist: The Cultural Politics of Economics from the Court 
to the “Nanny Wars,” 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 1291, 1299–1300 (2005); Martha R. Mahoney, Class 
and Status in American Law: Race, Interest, and the Anti-Transformation Cases, 76 S. CALIF. L. 
REV. 799, 804 (2003) (citing E.P. THOMPSON, THE MAKING OF THE ENGLISH WORKING CLASS 
(1964)). 
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food—all are ways that those of us in the upper-middle class enact our 
higher class status for all to see.”15 But Williams goes a step further by 
also challenging the hierarchy of tastes and folkways, which holds that 
upper-class cultural practices are objectively superior to others. She con-
tends that working-class “beliefs and lifestyles make as much sense in 
their context as our folkways do in ours.”16 In short, Williams does not 
assume that the upper-middle class are “class-less” or that theirs is the 
default culture. She thus does with regard to class one of the things criti-
cal race and feminist scholars have done for race and gender respective-
ly: challenge the notion that whites don’t have race and that men don’t 
have gender. Also similar to critical race and feminist scholars, Williams 
demonstrates that an aspect of privilege is the opportunity to render that 
very privilege invisible.  
Williams offers this scholarly contribution regarding class in rela-
tion to her interest in work-family issues because she says progressive 
elites (hereinafter “we” or “us”) need to understand and appreciate the 
working class if we are to make them our political allies. Williams cites 
ample evidence of the disdain in which the professional-managerial class 
hold the white working class, observing for example that “redneck jokes 
may be the last acceptable ethnic slurs in ‘polite’ society”17 and that aca-
demics “who would never utter a racial slur will casually refer to ‘trailer 
trash’ or ‘white trash.’”18 Williams decries such class-bashing by liberal 
elites: “The most refined fuel for class resentments is the culture of ca-
sual insults leveled by progressives toward the white working class. 
Changing U.S. politics will require an embargo on such insults.”19 Wil-
liams elaborates on several steps that the professional-managerial class 
should take: 
                                                     
 15. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 212. 
 16. Id. (“It is not a matter of objective truth that workers’ religion is uncool, their desire for 
certainty pathetic, their taste excruciating.”). 
 17. Id. at 154 (quoting WORKING-CLASS WOMEN IN THE ACADEMY: LABORERS IN THE 
KNOWLEDGE FACTORY 293 (Michelle M. Tokarczyk & Elizabeth A. Fay eds., 1993)). 
 18. Id. (quoting MICHAEL ZWEIG, WHAT’S CLASS GOT TO DO WITH IT?: AMERICAN SOCIETY 
IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 166 (2004)). Poor whites in the South and Appalachia are arguably 
held in particular contempt by social progressives. See MATT WRAY, NOT QUITE WHITE: WHITE 
TRASH AND THE BOUNDARIES OF WHITENESS 46 (2006) (documenting use “white trash” from its 
origins in the antebellum South to “more general, nonlocalized term for poor rural whites in every 
part of the nation” after the Civil War); Mahoney, supra note 14, at 809 (asserting that privileged 
white Americans tend to see working-class white southerners in particular as racist); id. at 840 n.158 
(noting that the middle class sometimes assume opposition to racism to be more common in higher 
status groups and rarely describe themselves “as afflicted with conflicts between moral claims and 
racial self-interest,” instead attributing “conflict between economics and social justice . . . to the 
working class”). 
 19. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 152. 
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The first is to institute the same kind of taboo against insulting 
white workers as now exists against using racial innuendo and in-
sults. The second step is to accept the fact that class is a key axis of 
social disadvantage in American life and to learn more about life in 
the Missing Middle [among the working class], so that we do not 
inadvertently offend potential allies by signaling that we are clue-
less about our class privilege. The third step is to identify aspects of 
non-elite culture that offer useful insights for the upper-middle 
class.20 
Williams is absolutely correct that class is a critical axis of disad-
vantage in the United States,21 even as it has been overlooked by scholars 
or simply collapsed into analyses focusing on race, gender, sexuality, or 
some other basis of identity.22 Williams’s indignation on behalf of the 
working class is well-founded, but she overlooks a recent shift in these 
class culture wars that she otherwise so aptly describes: the culture wars 
are now largely being fought—at least rhetorically—across the rural–
urban divide. 
Most recently and prominently, President Obama’s perceived repre-
sentation of the urban elite and Sarah Palin’s frequent invocation of 
small-town America galvanized the geographical culture wars in the 
                                                     
 20. Id. at 213 (suggesting “the norms of work devotion and concerted cultivation” as two pos-
sibilities). Elsewhere she implores progressives to “learn a lot more about their potential 
allies . . . because food, sports, vacations, and other practices and habits of the upper-middle class 
often are seen by working-class observers as expressions of class privilege,” resulting in what Wil-
liams calls the “class culture gap.” Id. at 152–53. 
 21. President Barack Obama has admitted as much in his suggestion that his daughters should 
not benefit from affirmative action, at least not in comparison to working-class whites. See Rachel L. 
Swarns, For Obama, a Delicate Path on Race and Class, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/03/world/americas/03iht-obama.1.14965389.html?scp=4&sq=% 
22affirmative%20action%22%20and%20daughters%20and%20obama&st=cs. 
 22. See BELL HOOKS, WHERE WE STAND: CLASS MATTERS 6 (2000) (“[T]he threat of class 
warfare, of class struggle, is just too dangerous to face. The neat binary categories of white and black 
or male and female are not there when it comes to class. How will they identify the enemy.”); June 
Carbone, Unpacking Inequality and Class: Family, Gender and the Reconstruction of Class Bar-
riers, NEW ENG. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (on file with author) (writing that disadvantaged per-
sons doing low wage work “often think of themselves in ethnic rather than economic terms, and 
indeed to the extent new groups replace other groups, economic position does not necessarily harden 
into a fixed group identity”); Angela P. Harris, Theorizing Class, Gender and the Law: Three Ap-
proaches, 72 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 37 (2009). Some have argued that class is different to other 
markers of identity because the working class do not necessarily want to stay in that class. Harris, 
supra, at 44 n.28 (quoting JOHN GUILLORY, CULTURAL CAPITAL: THE PROBLEM OF LITERARY 
CANON FORMATION 13 (1993)). Guillory writes, “Acknowledging the existence of admirable and 
even heroic elements of working-class culture, the affirmation of lower-class identity is hardly com-
patible with a program for the abolition of want.” Id. This assertion focuses on the material aspects 
of class while overlooking the cultural dimensions, which are significant components of identity for 
working-class whites, who may be proud to be “rednecks.” See JIM WEBB, BORN FIGHTING: HOW 
THE SCOTS-IRISH SHAPED AMERICA 181–82 (2004) (observing that rednecks “don’t particularly care 
what others think of them. To them, the joke has always been on those who utter the insult”). 
2011] The Geography of the Class Culture Wars 773 
2008 election cycle. As New York Times columnist David Brooks ob-
served a month before the election, “[N]o American politician plays the 
class-warfare card as constantly as Palin. Nobody so relentlessly divides 
the world between the ‘normal Joe Sixpack American’ and the coastal 
elite.”23 Frank Rich also identified the trend, referring to Palin’s “deftly 
coded putdown of her presumably shiftless big-city opponent” in what he 
called the “signature line” from her convention speech: “I guess a small-
town mayor is sort of like a community organizer, except that you have 
actual responsibilities.”24 
Other journalists and pundits not only reported from the front line, 
many ultimately joined in battle. Gail Collins accurately referred to Pa-
lin’s “small towns vs. the world mantra,”25 while also getting in a gra-
tuitous dig about rurality and rural pursuits, e.g., Palin teaching us the 
difference between a caribou and a moose.26 Indeed, hunting has proved 
an enduring emblem of the working class and, in particular, of Palin de-
votees, who Maureen Dowd of the New York Times recently accused of 
“eviscerating animals for fun.”27 Recall that Williams lists sports as just 
                                                     
 23. David Brooks, Op-Ed., The Class War Before Palin, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2008, at A33, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/10/opinion/10brooks.html?ref=davidbrooks. 
 24. Frank Rich, Op-Ed., She Broke the G.O.P. and Now She Owns It, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 
2009, at WK8, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/12/opinion/12rich.html?_r=1. 
 25. Gail Collins, Op-Ed., Thinking of Good Vibrations, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2008, at A33, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/06/opinion/06collins.html?scp=34&sq=election+op-
ed&st=nyt. 
 26. Id. Collins also observed that only about 106,000 people vote in Alaska, fewer than “in my 
immediate neighborhood!” She added, “What kind of state is this, anyway?” Id. This theme of rural 
people and rural states being unimportant because there are so few of them, while they are also polit-
ically overrepresented, was echoed in other columns. Gail Collins, Op-Ed., August is the Cruelest 
Month, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2009, at A19, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/08/opinion
/08collins.html?ref=gailcollins (stating that Senator Max Baucus of Montana assembled a special 
bipartisan negotiating committee on healthcare whose members “hail from Montana, North Dakota, 
New Mexico, Iowa, Maine and Wyoming. This was quite a coup on Baucus’s part, since you have to 
work really hard to put together six states that represent only 2.77 percent of the population.”); Da-
vid Brooks & Gail Collins, Op-Ed., This Just in from Montana, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2010, 
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/08/25/this-just-in-from-montana (dismissing Montana 
residents’ anti-Washington sentiment, in part because “Montana gets $1.47 back for every dollar it 
sends to Washington, and that the folks in Montana who feel they’re so powerless, each have 36 
times the representation in the U.S. Senate as a resident of California”). 
Steve Berg of MinnPost made some similar points about Palin and the geographical component of 
the culture wars but without the rural-bashing. He referred to Palin as “ambassador of small-town 
virtue and small-town grit.” Steve Berg, Irony and Small Towns on the Campaign Trail, MINNPOST, 
Sept. 8, 2008, http://www.minnpost.com/steveberg/2008/09/08/3422/irony_and_small_towns_on_th
e_campaign_trail. He further articulated a series of binaries representing the two camps in the cul-
ture wars: “[S]mall town against big city, talk radio and Fox News against ‘mainstream media,’ 
heartland against elite.” Id. 
 27. Maureen Dowd, Op-Ed., Pass the Caribou Stew, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2010, at A35, avail-
able at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/08/opinion/08dowd.html. 
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one of the practices or habits by which we exhibit our class.28 Mean-
while, Joe Bageant reminds us that the sporting endeavors of liberal 
elites are just as inexplicable to the working class; he names rock climb-
ing and wind surfing as two examples that cause the working class to 
shake their heads in derision.29 
Other pundits commented on Palin’s use of language—treating her 
folksiness as evidence she was unprepared or unfit to hold high office. 
Maureen Dowd, for example, poked fun at Palin’s use of colloquialisms 
like “darn right,” “doggone it,” and “reward’s in heaven,”30 yet these are 
standard linguistic fare for many Americans. As Joan Williams argues 
regarding various other manifestations of working-class culture,31 objec-
tively speaking, nothing is wrong with these phrases. One is simply an 
idiom, and many see the others as preferable to curse words.32 
To be honest, I too found myself laughing at many of these digs, 
albeit uneasily. Doing so was made easier because I was and am a 
staunch Obama supporter. Like many others, I am skeptical that Palin 
possesses the experience, education, or good judgment to hold high-level 
office, and I disagree with her on every major issue. But finding bases 
for criticizing Palin on substantive grounds was and is, to quote Thomas 
Friedman, like “shooting fish in a barrel”33 (why is Friedman permitted 
to be colloquial while Palin is not?). Given that so much in addition to 
style distinguished the Republican and Democratic presidential tickets 
from each other, I am not sure why the media devoted such attention to 
Palin’s cultural trappings. From the perspective of many rural or work-
ing-class voters, the mainstream media struck below the belt when it 
came to Palin. Her martyrdom at the media’s hands only fueled their 
                                                     
 28. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 152–53. 
 29. BAGEANT, supra note 4, at 68–70; see also WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 213 (observing that 
the disdain between the opposing sides in the culture wars flows both ways). 
 30. Maureen Dowd, Op-Ed., Sarah’s Pompom Palaver, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2008, at WK11, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/05/opinion/05dowd.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=pom%20 
pom%20palaver&st=cse&oref=slogin. 
 31. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 212. 
 32. I have been unable to find evidence that the national media derided folksy politicians from 
earlier eras, such as President Lyndon Baines Johnson and Sam Rayburn, Speaker of the House. The 
media described, for example, the contrast between Rayburn’s Washington and Texas personas and 
activities. See Edward T. Folliard, Rayburn, A Mighty Power in Government, WASH. POST & TIMES 
HERALD, Nov. 17, 1961, at B9 (providing an overview of Rayburn’s rise in Washington); Rayburn 
Elected in House Tradition, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1940, at 19 (highlighting Rayburn’s background 
as a farmer). Further, the press did not poke fun at Bill Clinton’s occasional folksiness, though this 
may be in part because he was a member of the “credentialed class.” See infra note 54. 
 33. Thomas L. Friedman, Op-Ed., Palin’s Kind of Patriotism, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2008, at 
A31, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/08/opinion/08friedman.html?_r=1. Indeed, as 
reflected in this column, Friedman is a good example of a commentator who criticized Palin on the 
substance while generally steering clear of cultural issues. 
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sense that the mainstream media is hopelessly biased and untrustworthy. 
In short, the media’s handling of Palin effectively confirmed rural Amer-
icans’ fears that liberal elites had written them off “as a relic, or worse, 
as a joke.”34 
In the midst of all this, Obama occasionally lived up to the reputa-
tion for urban elitism that had dogged his Democratic nominee predeces-
sors John Kerry and Al Gore. Most notably, Obama made his “biggest 
unforced error” in April 2008 in a gaffe that came to be known as Bitter-
gate. It was a stumble that explicitly invoked the rural–urban divide. 
Speaking at a fundraiser in San Francisco, Obama said: 
You go into these small towns in Pennsylvania, and like a lot of 
small towns in the Midwest, the jobs have been gone now for twen-
ty years and nothing’s replaced them. And they fell through the 
Clinton administration, and the Bush administration, and each suc-
cessive administration has said that somehow these communities are 
gonna regenerate and they have not. 
And it’s not surprising then they get bitter, they cling to guns or re-
ligion or antipathy to people who aren’t like them or anti-immigrant 
sentiment or anti-trade sentiment as a way to explain their frustra-
tions.35 
                                                     
 34. Matt Bai, Working for the Working Class Vote, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 15, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/19/magazine/19obama-t.html?scp=1&sq=matt%20bai%20 
working%20for%20the%20working%20class%20vote&st=cse. This backlash against rural people is 
in contrast to decades of idyll-izing nostalgia and sentimentality about rural people and places. See 
Pruitt, Rural Rhetoric, supra note 8, at 212–25; Ann R. Tickamyer & Debra A. Henderson, Rural 
Women: New Roles for the New Century?, in CHALLENGES FOR RURAL AMERICA IN THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY 109, 112 (David L. Brown & Louis E. Swanson eds., 2004) (describing rural com-
munities as “wholesome, family-friendly environments that promote overall well-being”); W.K. 
KELLOGG FOUND., PERCEPTIONS OF RURAL AMERICA: CONGRESSIONAL PERSPECTIVES 3–4 (2004), 
available at http://www.wkkf.org/knowledge-center/resources/2004/04/Perceptions-Of-Rural-
America-Views-From-The-US-Congress.aspx (finding most people associate the word “rural” with 
traditional values such as family, community, and religion). Indeed, despite his widely held associa-
tion with the urban, Barack Obama promised during his campaign for the presidency to hold a rural 
summit if he were elected, stating, “What’s good for rural America will be good for America. The 
values that are represented . . . are values that built America, and we’ve got to preserve them.” See 
Howard Berkes, Rural America to Obama: Remember Us, NPR, Nov. 22, 2008, available at 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=97307012. The rural summit hasn’t materia-
lized, but Secretary of Agriculture Tom Vilsack and several other cabinet secretaries participated in 
what they billed as a Rural Listening Tour in 2009. Bill Bishop, Obama Sends Cabinet Secretaries to 
Rural Communities, DAILY YONDER (July 1, 2009), http://www.dailyyonder.com/obama-sends-
cabinet-secretaries-rural-communities/2009/07/01/2207. 
 35. David Plouffe, Bittergate, DAILY BEAST (Nov. 3, 2009), http://www.thedaily 
beast.com/blogs-and-stories/2009-11-03/bittergate/. Williams discusses Bittergate as an example of 
how easily an astute politician like Obama can slip up when it comes to class. WILLIAMS, supra note 
1, at 190–91. One example of how a rural working-class voter responded to Obama’s comments is 
this: “That comment he made about guns and religion, it’s frightening, you have to admit.” Anne 
Hull, Disconnected from Obama’s America: Arkansans Wary of President-Elect’s Urban Perspec-
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Obama later explained himself and his comments to journalist Matt Bai 
for a New York Times Magazine story headlined Working for the Work-
ing Class Vote: 
How it was interpreted in the press was Obama talking to a bunch of 
wine-sipping San Francisco liberals with an anthropological view 
toward white working-class voters. And I was actually making the 
reverse point, clumsily, which is that these voters have a right to be 
frustrated because they’ve been ignored. And because Democrats 
haven’t met them halfway on cultural issues, we’ve not been able to 
communicate to them effectively an economic agenda that would 
help broaden our coalition. . . . 
. . . . 
I mean, part of what I was trying to say to that group in San 
Francisco was, “You guys need to stop thinking that issues like reli-
gion or guns are somehow wrong . . . .” Because, in fact, if you’ve 
grown up and your dad went out and took you hunting, and that is 
part of your self-identity and provides you a sense of continuity and 
stability that is unavailable in your economic life, then that’s going 
to be pretty important, and rightfully so. And if you’re watching 
your community lose population and collapse but your church is 
still strong and the life of the community is centered around that, 
well then, you know, we’d better be paying attention to that. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . To act like hunting, like somebody who wants firearms just 
doesn’t get it—that kind of condescension has to be purged from 
our vocabulary.36 
Interestingly, Obama’s explanation of his gaffe is remarkably similar to 
Joan Williams’s arguments regarding class: before we can effectively 
reach out to the working class we have to try to understand them. And 
that will require an end to the condescension. We must change the way 
we think about the white working class. Even more remarkable is that 
Obama’s explanation is a high-brow, low-emotion synopsis of Joe Ba-
geant’s 2007 book, the provocatively titled Deer Hunting with Jesus.37 
Bageant offers a highly sympathetic and compassionate explanation of 
                                                                                                                       
tive, WASH. POST, Jan. 16, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/ 
2009/01/15/AR2009011504254.html. “Frightening” strikes me as a telling word choice that provides 
some evidence of just how great the cultural rift is. I may have a double consciousness as both rural 
and urban, working class and professional-managerial class, but the word “frightening” seems very 
strong—and obviously reflects emotion. It also illustrates the significance of perspective in the con-
text of the culture wars. The woman in rural Arkansas finds Obama’s comments frightening, but 
socially conscious progressives might find frightening her use of that word to describe those com-
ments. 
 36. Bai, supra note 34, at 1 (quoting President Obama). 
 37. BAGEANT, supra note 4. 
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why working-class voters seem so clueless regarding their economic 
well-being, focusing instead on cultural issues such as guns and religion. 
I shall discuss Bageant’s book further below, but for now will observe 
only that I suspect that Obama or a staffer had read the book,38 which 
was published a year before Bittergate. 
Bittergate, and Obama’s explanation of it, support my argument 
that the culture wars have taken an increasingly vivid and significant 
geographical turn. Obama referred to religion, hunting, and population 
loss—all phenomena associated with rural communities, albeit not exclu-
sively. Obama thus conflated “working-class voters” with “rural voters.” 
Indeed, Obama specified the geographical setting of these voters who 
flummox us: “small towns.” 
Bai, too, collapsed “rural” and “working class.” The story’s head-
line referred to the working-class vote, but Bai deployed the word “rural” 
nineteen times to refer to the sort of voters Obama was trying to woo. In 
addition, the story featured rural vignettes from the campaign trail, most 
prominently one from Lebanon, Virginia, population 3,194, in the Appa-
lachian part of the state.39 Bai explained the importance of the rural vote, 
using Virginia as an example: 
For a National Democrat, the hardest part of the electoral for-
mula [in Virginia] is probably the last piece—holding one’s own in 
the sea of small towns in the southern and Appalachian regions of 
the state that are far more similar to the rest of the Deep South than 
they are to Virginia’s northern counties. Voters here haven’t known 
economic expansion in decades, and they seem to have decided long 
ago that neither party was especially serious about stopping the de-
cline, or even knew how. There is a strong sense in these communi-
ties, and not unreasonably, of suffering endless condescension—a 
feeling that urbane America has already written off the rural life-
style as a relic or, worse, as a joke. For that reason (and this is ac-
tually the point Obama says he was trying to make in San Francis-
co), cultural issues matter far more in the rural areas than they do in 
the exurbs, because voters see those issues as a test of whether poli-
ticians respect their values or mock them—a construct that Republi-
can strategists have become expert at exploiting.40 
Bai also discussed Obama’s efforts in other states considered Re-
publican territory, some of them in the South and many with significant 
rural populations: North Carolina, Indiana, Montana, Nevada, North Da-
                                                     
 38. See id. at 25, 35, 68 (discussing why John Kerry lacked support among working-class 
voters). 
 39. American FactFinder, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://factfinder.census.gov (search “Leba-
non” and select Virginia from the state list, then refer to 2005–2009 tab) (last visited Feb. 22, 2011). 
 40. Bai, supra note 34, at 4.  
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kota, and Georgia.41 Clearly, a lot of the working-class voters for whom 
Obama was working were rural.42 
Indeed, there were moments in the 2008 presidential election when 
one could almost have been fooled into thinking that rural voters mat-
tered.43 A few months before the election, one analyst wrote: “[T]he 
[2004] election came down to a handful of small towns in southern Ohio. 
If those and other small towns vote their pocketbooks, Obama should 
rally to win. If they hold to their cultural roots, McCain should win.”44 
Just two weeks before the election, a poll indicated that John McCain 
had lost ground among rural voters, the very ones credited with putting 
George W. Bush in the White House in 2000 and 2004.45 A Republican 
pollster declared that the election would “be fought in cities with popula-
tions between 50,000 and 100,000 residents.”46 Post-election analysis, 
however, was less generous regarding the import of the rural vote. 
                                                     
 41. Id. at 2; see also John Harwood, The Caucus: The White Working Class: Forgotten Voters 
No More, N.Y.TIMES, May 26, 2008, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9507E4DF10 
3FF935A15756C0A96E9C8B63&scp=1&sq=ruy+teixeira+harwood&st=nyt (discussing Obama’s 
efforts to win working-class voters with no mention of “rural” but discussing Hillary Clinton’s suc-
cesses in states like Indiana, Kentucky, Ohio and Pennsylvania). 
 42. See Barbara Pini et al., Teachers and the Emotional Dimension of Class in Resource-
Affected Rural Australia, 31 BRIT. J. SOC. EDUC. 17, 21 (2010) (suggesting that rural and working 
class get conflated in Australia). 
 43. See, e.g., Tim Murphy & Bill Bishop, Barack Obama Leads in Rural Contributions, DAILY 
YONDER (Sept. 16, 2007), http://www.dailyyonder.com/barack-obama-leads-rural-contributions. 
 44. Berg, supra note 26. Bill Clinton, campaigning for Democratic candidates during the 2010 
mid-term elections, suggested similar thinking when he “warned voters, ‘You are being played,’ and 
urged people to cast ballots with their economic self interest in mind.” Jeff Zeleny, Democrats’ Grip 
on the South Continues to Slip, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2010, at A18, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/19/us/politics/19south.html?scp=11&sq=bill+clinton+economy&s
t=nyt. 
 45. Howard Berkes, Poll: McCain Lost Key Rural Support in Early October, NPR, Oct. 23, 
2008, available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=96008609. Berkes re-
ported, “McCain was doing so poorly among a key voter group during the first three weeks of Octo-
ber, it seemed unlikely he could capture the presidency.” Id. He went on to put this finding in pers-
pective in relation to past elections: 
“In 2004, George Bush won the rural parts of the battleground [states] by 15 points,” 
notes Anna Greenberg, the Democratic pollster who conducted the bipartisan survey. “It 
was his base, and he got a massive amount of voters to turn out in those battleground 
states. It drove his victory.” 
But in 2008, Greenberg says, “John McCain is struggling just to win the rural vote in 
the battleground. That was supposed to be his base. If he can’t win the rural battleground 
with substantial margins . . . it seems very unlikely that he can win this election.” 
Id. 
 46. Berg, supra note 26. The pollster continued: “Instead of going to Detroit and Cleveland, 
you’re going to see [the Republican ticket] a lot more in the small towns.” Id.; see also Howard 
Berkes, supra note 45. 
In 2004, “Urban areas voted overwhelmingly Democratic, and rural areas voted over-
whelmingly Republican,” says Bill Bishop, author of The Big Sort, which compares 30 
years of demographic data and election returns. Four years ago, rural counties gave Pres-
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Journalists reporting and analyzing the election contemplated 
whether the rural South mattered anymore.47 Some noted that the number 
of rural voters has fallen significantly in just the last two decades.48 In 
fact, analysts disagreed on the role of the rural vote in Obama’s win, 
finding myriad ways to slice and dice the data. Obama carried the rural 
vote in a dozen states,49 faring better among rural voters than John Kerry 
had in 2004.50 Still, Obama garnered less support from rural voters than 
                                                                                                                       
ident Bush a margin of 4.1 million votes. That was enough to overcome John Kerry’s 
margin of 3.7 million votes in urban counties. Bishop says the question now is, “Will the 
Republican Party be able to maintain those [rural] margins to offset what clearly will be a 
strong vote for Barack Obama [in cities]?” 
Id. 
 47. See Hull, supra note 35 (commenting on the perceived cultural disconnect between Obama 
and rural residents of Arkansas, most of whom did not support Obama); Adam Nossiter, For South, 
A Waning Hold on National Politics, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2008, at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/11/us/politics/11south.html?hp (arguing that, by voting for John 
McCain, “voters from Texas to South Carolina and Kentucky may have marginalized their region for 
some time to come”). Nossiter also wrote: 
Southern counties that voted more heavily Republican this year than in 2004 tended to be 
poorer, less educated and whiter, a statistical analysis by The New York Times shows. 
Mr. Obama won in only 44 counties in the Appalachian belt, a stretch of 410 counties 
that runs from New York to Mississippi. Many of those counties, rural and isolated, have 
been less exposed to the diversity, educational achievement and economic progress expe-
rienced by more prosperous areas. 
Id. Frank Rich made a similar point: 
Those occasional counties that tilted more Republican in 2008 tended to be not only the 
least diverse, but also the most rural, least educated and slowest-growing in population. 
McCain–Palin did score a landslide among white evangelical Christians, though even in 
that demographic Obama shaved the G.O.P. margin by seven percentage points from 
2004. 
Frank Rich, Op-Ed., The Moose Stops Here, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2008, at WK12, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/16/opinion/16rich.html?scp=22&sq=election+op-ed&st=nyt. 
Indeed, late 2010 data and analysis suggested that Sarah Palin supporters tend to be “Republicans 
with lower incomes and lower educational attainment.” Nate Silver, Sarah Palin’s Nomination 
Chances: A Reassessment, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2010, http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/ 
2010/12/31/sarah-palins-nomination-chances-a-reassessment/?hp. 
 48. Nate Silver, How Obama Really Won the Election, ESQUIRE, Jan. 14, 2009, available at 
http://www.esquire.com/features/data/how-obama-won-0209?src=rss (“In 1992, when Bill Clinton 
won his first term, 35 percent of American voters were identified as rural according to that year’s 
national exit polls, and 24 percent as urban. This year, however, the percentage of rural voters has 
dropped to 21 percent, while that of urban voters has climbed to 30. The suburbs, meanwhile, have 
been booming: 41 percent of America’s electorate in 1992, they represent 49 percent now . . . .”). 
 49. Tim Murphy & Bill Bishop, The 2008 Election: State by State, DAILY YONDER (Dec 5, 
2008), http://www.dailyyonder.com/2008-election-state-state/2008/12/05/1789. The twelve states 
were California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire, 
New Mexico, South Carolina, Vermont, and Wisconsin. Id. 
 50. Silver, supra note 48 (noting that the McCain–Palin ticket beat Obama by just 2.4 million 
votes in rural areas, whereas Bush won a 4.3 million vote margin among rural voters, and suggesting 
that McCain would have been wiser to target the suburban vote rather than the rural vote); see also 
Rich, supra note 47 (noting that the McCain–Palin ticket “score[d] a landslide among white evangel-
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from other demographic slices. Obama carried each of the seventeen 
most densely populated states,51 a list that included Indiana and Ohio, 
which had supported Bush in 2004.52 Frank Rich pointed out that the 
“occasional counties that tilted more Republican in 2008 [than in 2004] 
tended to be not only the least diverse, but also the most rural, least edu-
cated, and slowest-growing in population.”53 By and large, the media did 
not acknowledge that many rural residents were among the swing voters 
who bestowed on Democrats the big political victory—one that included 
U.S. Senate and House seats, as well as considerable support for Obama. 
Commentators didn’t let go of the rural–urban binary in the after-
math of the election, and the rural-bashing eventually escalated. On elec-
tion night, NPR declared Obama the “first urban Democrat to be presi-
dent since really Truman.” Or was Obama the most recent northern urban 
president since JFK, another commentator queried. Both agreed that Ob-
ama, like other recent presidents, was a member of the “credentialed 
class.”54 Indeed, the rhetorical victory lap of left-leaning media pundits 
included a celebration of the cosmopolitan, the urbane, the privileged—
in short, a celebration of their own ilk. One manifestation was David 
Brooks’s column a few weeks after Obama’s election in which Brooks 
smugly listed the Ivy League credentials of the Obamas and many who 
were likely to serve in the Obama Administration.55 
Jan. 20, 2009, will be a historic day. Barack Obama (Columbia, 
Harvard Law) will take the oath of office as his wife, Michelle 
(Princeton, Harvard Law), looks on proudly. Nearby, his foreign 
policy advisers will stand beaming, including perhaps Hillary Clin-
ton (Wellesley, Yale Law), Jim Steinberg (Harvard, Yale Law) and 
Susan Rice (Stanford, Oxford D. Phil.). 
The domestic policy team will be there, too, including Jason 
Furman (Harvard, Harvard Ph.D.), Austan Goolsbee (Yale, M.I.T. 
                                                                                                                       
ical Christians” although Obama “shaved the G.O.P. margin by seven percentage points from 
2004”). 
 51. Silver, supra note 48 (noting that these states included Virginia and North Carolina). 
 52. David Brooks, Op-Ed., Midwest at Dusk, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2010, at A33, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/05/opinion/05brooks.html?_r=1&hp (noting that Obama also 
carried Iowa, which had supported Bush in 2004). 
 53. Rich, supra note 47 (“The Republicans lost every region of the country by double digits 
except the South, which they won by less than double digits (9 points). They took the South only 
because McCain, who ran roughly even with Obama among whites in every other region, won 
Southern whites by 38 percentage points.”). 
 54. Election-night coverage (NPR radio broadcast Nov. 4, 2008) (at the moment the network 
declared Obama the winner) (transcript on file with author). 
 55. David Brooks, Op-Ed., The Insider’s Crusade, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2008, at A35, availa-
ble at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/21/opinion/21brooks.html?scp=1&sq=insider%27s+crusade 
&st=nyt. 
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Ph.D.), Blair Levin (Yale, Yale Law), Peter Orszag (Princeton, 
London School of Economics Ph.D.) and, of course, the White 
House Counsel Greg Craig (Harvard, Yale Law). 
This truly will be an administration that looks like America, or 
at least that slice of America that got double 800s on their SATs. 
Even more than past administrations, this will be a valedictocracy—
rule by those who graduate first in their high school classes. If a 
foreign enemy attacks the United States during the Harvard-Yale 
game any time over the next four years, we’re screwed.56 
Even as he poked fun at this lot by calling them “overeducated Achieva-
trons,” Brooks embraced their homogeneity as elites and Washington 
insiders.57 
In perhaps the most off-putting part of the column, Brooks implicit-
ly acknowledged how these elites pass down their privilege to their 
children: “So many of them send their kids to Georgetown Day School, 
the posh leftish private school in D.C., that they’ll be able to hold White 
House staff meetings in the carpool line.”58 I suspect that any working-
class cog reading Brooks’s column felt nauseated—or really angry.59 
Such comments only fuel the sense among middle Americans—whether 
the “Missing Middle” (aka working class),60 those living in the “flyover” 
states, or the large group who fall into both categories—that the Obama 
Administration and liberal elites are an exclusive clique, living in a world 
that is beyond their reach and maybe even beyond their imagination.61 
                                                     
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. I am reminded of Bageant’s reference to the wealthy sending their children to private 
schools as a basis of working-class resentment against them. BAGEANT, supra note 4, at 102. This is 
somewhat ironic, of course, since many in the working class purport not to value education. Id. at 10, 
70. They may therefore not perceive class injury as manifest in lack of access to better education. 
Educational attainment may be something that working-class folks do not aspire to because it is so 
far from their grasp. See infra note 61. 
 59. See BAGEANT, supra note 4, at 101 (talking about “class hate between whites”). Bageant 
writes of the selfishness of the rich, who want to sock away more wealth for their own children, even 
as they are unconcerned about the broader well-being of society. Id. at 28. I borrow the term “cog” 
from Bageant, who notes that working whites “are good cogs and show great deference toward any 
type of authority. At work many are treated like children.” Id. at 171. Williams makes a similar point 
about the working class raising their children to be good factory workers. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, 
at 166–67 (quoting ALFRED LUBRANO, LIMBO: BLUE-COLLAR ROOTS, WHITE-COLLAR DREAMS 10 
(2004)) (“In the working class, people perform jobs in which they are closely supervised and are 
required to follow orders and instructions. [So they bring their children] up in a home in which con-
formity, obedience, and intolerance for back talk are the norm—the same characteristics that make 
for a good factory worker.”). 
 60. See infra note 107 (discussing Williams’s taxonomy, which equates these). 
 61. I believe this is part of the reason that working-class voters focus on cultural issues rather 
than economic ones. It is also consistent with Jennifer Sherman’s description of working-class voters 
seeing economic issues as “distant and untouchable.” SHERMAN, supra note 4, at 100. 
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If this seems hypersensitive on behalf of the working class, I am no 
more sensitive than Williams, who compares working-class wounds to 
sunburn, “[S]o painful that the slightest touch makes you pull away, 
wincing.”62 I think working-class Americans could have done without 
the gloating, though at least Brooks was sufficiently honest—and 
aware—to title the column The Insider’s Crusade and to laugh at the 
“vast, heaving O-phoria now sweeping the coastal haute bourgeoisie.”63 
What Brooks didn’t acknowledge, perhaps because he doesn’t realize 
it—or doesn’t see it as relevant—is that none of those listed in his “vale-
dictocracy” is from a working-class background, except the Obamas 
themselves.64 If they were all first in their high-school classes, I daresay 
none of those high schools was a mediocre (or worse) public school in 
middle America. 
                                                     
 62. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 190. 
 63. Brooks, supra note 55. Indeed, it was not Brooks’s only recent reference to the relevance of 
geography. See Brooks, supra note 52 (asserting that the Midwest, which he defines broadly as 
starting in “central New York and Pennsylvania and then stretch[ing] out through Ohio and Indiana 
before spreading out to include Wisconsin and Arkansas” is “the beating center of American life—
the place where the trajectory of American politics is being determined” and that while “people on 
the coasts” might associate the sixties with Woodstock, people in the Midwest “might remember the 
last time there were plenty of good jobs instead.”); David Brooks, Op-Ed., The Limits of Policy, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2010, at A31, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/04/ 
opinion/04brooks.html?adxnnl=1&ref=homepage&src=me&adxnnlx=1292166022-N0k1HZ/Y4Xu1 
WWuGCLxj2A. In this column, Brooks asserts: 
The region you live in also makes a gigantic difference in how you will live. There are 
certain high-trust regions where highly educated people congregate, producing positive 
feedback loops of good culture and good human capital programs. This mostly happens 
in the northeastern states like New Jersey and Connecticut. There are other regions with 
low social trust, low education levels and negative feedback loops. This mostly happens 
in southern states like Arkansas and West Virginia. 
Id. 
 64. I consider President Obama to be from a working-class background based on his descrip-
tions of his upbringing—largely by his maternal grandparents—in Hawaii. BARACK OBAMA, 
DREAMS FROM MY FATHER: A STORY OF RACE AND INHERITANCE (1995); see also Helen Joy Poli-
car, The Shadow of the American Dream: The Clash of Class Ascension and Shame, 31 REVISION 
19, 19 (2010) (describing Obama’s background as working class). But see WILLIAMS, supra note 1, 
at 191 (discussing Maureen Dowd’s assertion that Obama is out of touch with the working class 
because his mother had a Ph.D. in anthropology). At the very least, the various influences in Ob-
ama’s upbringing illustrate the slipperiness of class. Although his working-class, maternal grandpa-
rents did his day-to-day raising, his mother no doubt exposed him to the “life of the mind.” See 
BAGEANT, supra note 4, at 10 (discussing the “intellectual bareness and brutality of the [working-
class] environment”); id. at 70 (discussing the luxury of time for the working class, who see liberals 
with time to read—and even be in book clubs—as suspect); cf. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 168 
(assuming the working class are less focused on teaching their children academic material because of 
a desire to let them be kids until they are old enough to have to assume responsibility). As for Mi-
chelle Obama, the New York Times published her family tree. Gabriel Dance & Elisabeth Goodridge, 
The Family Tree of Michelle Obama, The First Lady, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2009, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2009/10/08/us/politics/20091008-obama-family-tree.html?scp= 
17&sq=swarns%20obama&st=cse. 
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The Brooks column illustrates how the victorious Democrats and 
the liberal media, basking in the glow of the big win, were not the most 
gracious of winners. Frank Rich aptly characterized commentary like that 
of Brooks as “Washington’s cheerleading for our new New Frontier cab-
inet superstars . . . .”65 Rich used David Halberstam’s book, The Best and 
the Brightest, to discuss what might be missing from Obama’s team, ob-
serving that the irony Halberstam intended by his book’s title had often 
been lost: 
In his 20th-anniversary reflections, Halberstam wrote that his favo-
rite passage in his book was the one where Johnson, after his first 
Kennedy cabinet meeting, raved to his mentor, the speaker of the 
House, Sam Rayburn, about all the president’s brilliant men. “You 
may be right, and they may be every bit as intelligent as you say,” 
Rayburn responded, “but I’d feel a whole lot better about them if 
just one of them had run for sheriff once.” 66 
Rich was not so much standing up for the wisdom of small-town (or 
small-time) politicians as he was questioning the professional expe-
riences of some of Obama’s hotshot financial advisors. Nevertheless, the 
Rayburn quote makes another point: diversity of personal history and life 
experiences is surely desirable on a leadership team,67 especially one 
 
  
                                                     
 65. Frank Rich, Op-Ed., The Brightest Are Not Always the Best, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2008, at 
WK9, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/07/opinion/07rich.html?em. 
 66. Id. The column continued, “Halberstam loved that story because it underlined the weakness 
of the Kennedy team: ‘the difference between intelligence and wisdom, between the abstract quick-
ness and verbal facility which the team exuded, and true wisdom, which is the product of hard-won, 
often bitter experience.’” Id. 
 67. Rural advocates have criticized Obama appointees collectively for a lack of such diversity 
of experience and, in particular, the absence of those with rural backgrounds. See Bill Bishop, Speak 
Your Piece: Running for Sheriff, DAILY YONDER (Dec. 20, 2010), http://www.dailyyonder.com/ 
speak-your-peace-running-sheriff/2010/12/17/3089 (“The White House chose 25 people to serve on 
its Council for Community Solutions. . . . Not one lived in rural America—a loss for the Council and 
for President Obama. . . . We’re not the first to notice President Obama’s attraction to thick resumes, 
coastal connections and Ivy League diplomas. This White House would sniff at a degree from a land 
grant school. So when it came time to pick a Supreme Court justice, nobody from rural America was 
considered. And the Obama Administration’s education policy is utterly urban centric.”); Lisa R. 
Pruitt, A Cabinet Post for Culture, But Would It Include the Rural Variety?, LEGAL RURALISM BLOG 
(Sept. 27, 2008 7:27 AM), http://legalruralism.blogspot.com/2008/12/cabinet-post-for-culture-but-
would-it.html (“I guess I am looking pretty hard for signs that someone is thinking about rural 
America as we prepare for the inauguration of a very cosmopolitan President and his incredibly 
urbane cabinet.”). But see Editorial, Obama’s Well-Stocked Cabinet, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2008, 
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-ed-cabinet28-2008dec28,0,1331420.story (overlooking the 
cabinet’s lack of rural representation and ignoring class in announcing that Obama has picked a 
cabinet that “looks like America” by “assembling an impressive roster that includes men and wom-
en, blacks, whites, Latinos and Asian Americans”). 
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leading a nation in which 70% of citizens remain working class.68 
Many journalists commented on Obama’s urban-ness pre-election 
and his urbane-ness in the post-election period. Nate Silver suggested in 
Esquire magazine that Obama might be the first urban President, calling 
him “unmistakably urban: pragmatic, superior, hip, stubborn, multicul-
tural.”69 Silver also referred to Obama as “the only American president in 
recent history to seem unembarrassed about claiming a personal resi-
dence in a major U.S. city. Instead, presidents have tended to hail from 
homes called ranches or groves or manors or plantations, in places called 
Kennebunkport or Santa Barbara or Oyster Bay or Northampton.”70 Ra-
chel Swarns of the New York Times praised the Obamas for being out 
and about in Washington, D.C., characterizing them as “city 
people . . . who have long felt at home in the urban landscape.”71 Anne 
Hull wrote in the Washington Post of Obama’s “global, biracial 
polish.”72 Thus, as our nation gloriously transcended the race divide—if 
only by one significant measure73—it further embraced a geographic or 
spatial divide, one in which rural folk became a new “other.”74 
                                                     
 68. See infra notes 112–13 and accompanying text. This points up the diversity value not only 
of those with rural backgrounds, but also of class migrants. 
 69. Silver, supra note 48 (emphasis added). 
 70. Id. (“We may still romanticize some of the more familiar, rurally oriented narratives of 
presidents past: the Ronald Reagan frontiersman caricature (which both Sarah Palin and John 
McCain tried to co-opt at various times) or the Bill Clinton born-in-a-small-town shtick (see also: 
Edwards, John; Huckabee, Mike).”); see also Rachel L. Swarns, Could It Really Be Him? Yeah, 
Probably, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2009, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D0DEEDA 
1330F935A15750C0A96F9C8B63&scp=5&sq=swarns+obama+urban&st=nyt (describing President 
Obama as “the first president since Richard M. Nixon to be elected while living in a city neighbor-
hood, in his case, Chicago’s racially and economically diverse Hyde Park”). 
 71. Swarns, supra note 70. 
 72. See Hull, supra note 35 (commenting on the perceived cultural disconnect between Obama 
and rural residents of Arkansas, most of whom did not support Obama). 
 73. See Rachel L. Swarns, Blacks Debate Civil Rights Risk in Obama’s Rise, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
25, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/25/world/americas/25iht-25race.15597713.html?scp= 
56&sq=swarns%20obama&st=cse. This notion that race no longer matters is often reflected in the 
phrase “post-race America,” though many see this as a myth that stymies progress in addressing 
disparities according to race. See Charles A. Ghallagher, Color-Blind Privilege: The Social and 
Political Functions of Erasing the Color Line in Post-Race America, 10 RACE, GENDER & CLASS 
575 (2004) “Embracing a post-race, color-blind perspective provides whites with a degree of psycho-
logical comfort by allowing them to imagine that being white or black or brown has no bearing on an 
individual’s or a group’s relative place in the socioeconomic hierarchy.” Id. at 576. The phrase 
“post-race” has been particularly prevalent since President Obama’s election. See Mario L. Barnes, 
Erwin Chemerinsky & Trina Jones, A Post-Race Equal Protection?, 98 GEO. L.J. 967 (2010) (ob-
serving that “the United States appears to be in a state of racial fatigue. . . . Post-racialism makes it 
unnecessary to focus on the problems. Being post-racial feels good . . . .” Id. at 976. “[O]ne of the 
most significant problems with the current post-race moment” is that it “does not adequately account 
for the disparate conditions under which many people of color struggle.” Id. at 982. The Association 
of American Law Schools (AALS) held a 2010 Mid-Year Meeting exploring this theme. Workshop 
on “Post-Racial” Civil Rights Law, Politics and Legal Education: New and Old Color Lines in the 
Age of Obama, THE ASS’N OF AM. L. SCH. (June 8–12, 2010), https://memberaccess.aals.org/ 
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Practically speaking, the consequences of the Democrats’ across-
the-board win did not end with a rhetorical victory lap. Stimulus dollars 
became part of the spoils of victory, and debates about how the funds 
should be spent often pitted rural interests against urban ones. Post-
election conversations about spending echoed pre-election rhetoric about 
pork-barrel politics that would benefit states with small and sparse popu-
lations. A piece featuring the pejorative title Village Idiocy appeared in 
the New Republic just before the election,75 about the time the much-
discussed “bridge to nowhere” became a metaphor for allegedly wasteful 
spending. It was a metaphor with rural overtones because the actual 
bridge at stake was to link the town of Ketchikan, Alaska, population 
7,640,76 with its airport. The per capita cost of the bridge was indeed 
high, but the widely embraced metaphor was dismissive—even deri-
sive—of rural residents and their needs. In arguing that the focus of sti-
mulus spending should be metropolitan infrastructure projects, the 
Brookings Institute called for a “bridge to somewhere.”77 Meanwhile, the 
New York Times referred to federal spending for broadband infrastructure 
                                                                                                                       
eWeb//DynamicPage.aspx?webcode=myinfo&Reg_evt_key=25c62e71-9fc9-4177-830d-109991 
854830&RegPath=EventRegFees. 
 74. Cf. Debra Lyn Bassett, Ruralism, 88 IOWA L. REV. 273, 292–98 (2003) (documenting 
negative rural stereotypes in popular culture well before the 2008 election). 
 75. Bradley & Katz, supra note 5. The story was not quite as negative about rural America as 
the title suggests. Bradley and Katz, of the Brookings Institute, were primarily arguing that the na-
tion should be invested in metropolitan areas rather than in rural or nonmetropolitan ones. In that 
context, they challenged “the idea that we are a nation of small towns,” writing, “Palin’s positioning 
may appeal to a certain nostalgia that Americans have about small-town life, but the Manichean 
dichotomy of city versus small town (not to mention “urban” candidate versus “rural” one) no longer 
describes the radically connected and interdependent way Americans live and work.” Id. 
 76. American FactFinder, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://factfinder.census.gov (search “Ketchi-
kan City” and select Alaska from the state list, then refer to 2005–2009 tab). Sarah Palin denounced 
the project at the Republican National Convention saying that if Alaska wanted the bridge they 
would pay for it themselves. Ken Dilanian, Palin Backed ‘Bridge to Nowhere’ in 2006, USA 
TODAY, Sept. 1, 2008, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/politics/election2008/2008-08-
31-palin-bridge_N.htm (quoting Sarah Palin) (“I told Congress, ‘Thanks, but no thanks,’ on that 
bridge to nowhere . . . If our state wanted a bridge,’ I said, ‘we’d build it ourselves.’”). The bridge 
was never built, but Alaska still received the funds with the bridge earmark removed. The Palin 
administration nevertheless followed through on construction of the “road to nowhere,” which is, 
with the exception of land access, completely useless. See Abbie Boudreau & Scott Bronstein, The 
Bridge Failed, But the ‘Road to Nowhere’ Was Built, CNNPOLITICS.COM, Sept. 24, 2008, 
http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/09/24/palin.road.to.nowhere/index.html#cnnSTCText; Steve 
Quinn, Alaska Town Opens ‘Road to Nowhere,’ USA TODAY, Sept. 20, 2008, 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/topstories/2008-09-20-2839100226_x.htm. 
 77. See Steve Berg, Ready for Reinvestment? State Caught in Paradigm Shift, MINNPOST, Dec. 
16, 2008, http://www.minnpost.com/steveberg/2008/12/16/5306/ready_for_reinvestment_state_caug
ht_in_paradigm_shift. 
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in rural areas as a “Cyberbridge to Nowhere.”78 All implied that rural 
residents were “nobodies.”79 
While the battles for stimulus funds were often fought in state 
houses,80 the turf was sometimes federal. One of the harshest statements 
about rural livelihoods came from former FCC commissioner Michael 
Katz in February 2009. Regarding the Obama Administration’s support 
for rural broadband infrastructure, Katz commented, “Other people don’t 
like to say bad things about rural areas . . . [s]o I will. . . . The notion that 
we should be helping people who live in rural areas avoid the costs that 
they impose on society . . . is misguided . . . from an efficiency point of 
view and an equity one.”81 Katz called rural places “environmentally 
hostile, energy inefficient and even weak in innovation, simply because 
rural people are spread out across the landscape.”82 Dee Davis of the 
                                                     
 78. David M. Herszenhorn, Internet Money in Fiscal Plan: Wise or Waste?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
3, 2009, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/03/us/politics/03broadband.html?_r=1
&scp=1&sq=cyber%20bridge%20to%20nowhere&st=cse. 
 79. I am reminded of Angela Harris’s discussion of “personhood” and how “economic practic-
es and institutions converge” to “diminish the personhood of certain individuals and groups” leaving 
them vulnerable to oppression. Harris, supra note 22, at 51 (citing and discussing Iris Marion 
Young’s Five Faces of Oppression). While Harris offers this analysis in relation to gender and class, 
I believe it applies to the rural working class, whom the media and perhaps other “[s]ystems of sub-
ordination” have constructed as “deserving of less respect than others.” Id. at 52. Harris calls us to 
consider “the process by which this happens rather than only criticize the result.” Id.; see also 
WRAY, supra note 18, at 47, 50, 65–95 (discussing history of “white trash” and similar terms; dating 
the denigration of poor whites to the antebellum period when “a national preoccupation with rural 
people and rural life as backward and regressive, premodern and therefore unenlightened” emerged; 
and revealing that “white trash” and similar monikers, at times, described a status lower than blacks 
and Native Americans; those so labeled were at one time the object of a eugenics campaign). 
 80. See Michael Cooper & Griff Palmer, Cities Lose Out on Road Funds from Federal Stimu-
lus, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2009, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/09/us/09projects
.html?scp=1&sq=washington+stimulus+seattle+&st=nyt (noting that “cities and their surrounding 
regions are getting far less than two-thirds of federal transportation stimulus money” even though 
“[t]wo-thirds of the country lives in large metropolitan areas” and quoting a senior fellow from the 
Brookings Institute’s Metropolitan Policy Institute for the proposition that “[t]he 100 largest metro-
politan areas also contribute three-quarters of the nation’s economic activity . . .”); Berg, supra note 
77 (noting that federal transportation funds “pass[] through state legislatures with formulas and 
restrictions that favor rural road projects over transit projects in metro areas” and arguing for a dif-
ferent system that favors metropolitan areas because they drive most states’ GDPs). 
 81. Howard Berkes, Stimulus Stirs Debate Over Rural Broadband Access, NPR, Feb. 16, 2009, 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=100739283. “The stimulus package includes 
$7.2 billion to expand broadband Internet access into ‘underserved’ and rural areas.” Id. Berkes 
suggested that a better use of the funds would be to combat infant deaths. Id.; see also Ezra Klein, 
Why we still need cities, WASH. POST, Mar. 4, 2011, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/ezra-
klein/2011/03/why_we_still_need_cities.html (expressing public resentment over the “raft of subsi-
dies” going to rural America, including farm subsidies). But see Bill Bishop, The Myth of Rural 
Subsidies, DAILY YONDER, Mar. 10, 2011, http://www.dailyyonder.com/not-thinking-about-rural-
subsidies/2011/03/09/3221 (asserting that federal per capita spending is higher in urban places than 
in rural ones).  
 82. Berkes, supra note 81. 
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Center for Rural Strategies responded: “When people think of rural as 
‘nowhere,’ [they’re] saying the people who live in those places aren’t 
worth working with, they’re not worth helping.”83 I found myself think-
ing that public officials and the media would never make such comments 
about redevelopment and other initiatives aimed at assisting racial or 
ethnic minorities, or others in urban settings. I also found myself hoping 
that young people in rural America were not consumers of this commen-
tary, lest their stereotype threat84 be aggravated. 
Then, in July 2009, Frank Rich launched an open-throated attack on 
rural voters, apparently provoked by Palin’s ongoing presence on the 
national stage. Rich wrote of “a dwindling white nonurban America that 
is aflame with grievances and awash in self-pity as the country hurtles 
into the 21st century and leaves it behind.”85 Rich called these Americans 
a party of “resentment and victimization.”86 He recognized the Republi-
can Party’s denigration of its “base,” even as he further disparaged that 
base with a geographical metaphor, writing that “liberals and conserva-
tives alike tend to ghettoize [the Republican base] as a rump backwater 
minority.”87 I found Rich’s observation ironic in light of his own contri-
butions to the group’s marginalization, but he is correct that many high-
brow conservatives have articulated very unfavorable views of the 
GOP’s small-town constituency—and some also of Palin herself.88 
                                                     
 83. Id. 
 84. “Stereotype threat” occurs when “one recognizes that a negative stereotype about one’s 
group is applicable to oneself . . . that one could be judged or treated in terms of that stereotype, or 
that one could inadvertently do something that would confirm it.” Claude M. Steele, Expert Report: 
Reports Submitted on Behalf of the University of Michigan: The Compelling Need for Diversity in 
Higher Education, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 439, 445 (1999); see also Policar, supra note 64 (describ-
ing the self doubt and shame experienced by class migrants). I am suggesting, of course, that the 
rural-bashing is likely to contribute to a sense that rurality is a source of identity. See Michael M. 
Bell, The Fruit of Difference: The Rural-Urban Continuum as a System of Identity, 57 RURAL SOC. 
65 (1992) (arguing that the rural-urban continuum is an important source of identity for “country” 
residents in the United Kingdom); Diane S. Berry, Gretchen M. Jones & Stan A. Kuczaj, Differing 
States of Mind: Regional Affiliation, Personality Judgment, and Self-View, 22 BASIC & APPLIED 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 43 (2000) (discussing place of origin as primary determinant of self-identity); David 
M. Hummon, City Mouse, Country Mouse: The Persistence of Community Identity, 9 QUALITATIVE 
SOC. 3 (1986) (discussing community identity). 
 85. See Rich, supra note 24; see also Berg, supra note 26 (characterizing “those left behind in 
small towns” as carrying “obnoxious” resentments). 
 86. Rich, supra note 24 (“Palin gives this movement a major party brand and political plausi-
bility . . . .”). Rich also wrote in this column, “The Palinist ‘real America’ is demographically 
doomed to keep shrinking. But the emotion it represents is disproportionately powerful for its num-
bers.” Id. 
 87. Id.; see also Berg, supra note 26 (suggesting both Democrats and Republicans are manipu-
lating rural voters and that neither party takes rural interests seriously). 
 88. See, e.g., Ramesh Ponnuru, Reform School: Sarah Palin and the Future of the GOP, NAT’L 
REV., Nov. 17, 2008 (analyzing conservative commentary about Palin and her supporters; quoting 
Rush Limbaugh as referring to the “Wal-Mart class”; criticizing David Brooks and David Frum for 
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Meanwhile, Sarah Palin continues to provide a lightning rod for 
progressive elites. New York Times columnist Charles M. Blow proc-
laimed in a December 2010 column, She Who Must Not Be Named, that 
he would “no longer take part in the left’s obsessive-compulsive fascina-
tion” with Palin, which he labeled “unhealthy and counterproductive.”89 
Blow wrote: 
[T]he left continues to elevate her every utterance so that they can 
mock and deride her. The problem is that this strategy continues to 
backfire. The more the left tries to paint her as one of the “Mean 
Girls,” the more the right sees her as “Erin Brockovich.” The never-
ending attempts to tear her down only build her up . . . . 
People on the left seem to need her, to bash her, because she is, 
in three words, the way the left likes to see the right: hollow, dim 
and mean.90 
But some were deaf to Blow’s call for a moratorium on Palin-bashing. 
Maureen Dowd apparently found Palin and her small-town minions irre-
sistible, and in a column headlined Pass the Caribou Stew, published a 
few days after Blow’s, Dowd returned to the hunting and wildlife theme. 
Dowd ridiculed Palin merely for participating in a reality television show 
called Sarah Palin’s Alaska. The column took aim at Palin based on her 
status as a quasi-political figure, but in doing so, it gratuitously slammed 
hunting and fishing.91 Dowd wrote: 
Sarah checked her freezer at home before she flew 600 miles to 
the Arctic, trying to justify her contention that she needs to hunt to 
eat. Wasn’t it already stocked with those halibuts she clubbed and 
gutted in an earlier show? 
“My dad has taught me that if you want to have wild, organic, 
healthy food,” she pontificated, “you’re gonna go out there and hunt 
yourself and fish yourself and you’re gonna fill up your freezer.” 
Does Palin really think the average housewife in Ohio who 
can’t pay her bills is going to load up on ammo, board two different 
planes, camp out for two nights with a film crew and shoot a cari-
bou so she can feed her family organic food?92 
                                                                                                                       
suggesting Palin and her supporters represent “anti-intellectualism”; and asserting that “[a]ny sensi-
ble politics includes an important role for elites”). 
 89. Charles M. Blow, She Who Must Not Be Named, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2010, at A23, availa-
ble at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/04/opinion/04blow.html?src=me&ref=general. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Dowd, supra note 27. 
 92. Id. 
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A working-class family in middle America reading this will realize that 
Dowd is not only ignorant of them, she is deriding them. They know they 
don’t have to fly to Alaska on two planes to go hunting.93 Most just need 
to head out to the local deer woods to fill up their freezers, and many of 
them do just that every autumn.94 They do it in good times, and they do it 
in lean times. While it is part sport, it is also part of how they provide for 
their families.95 But in her haste to express scorn for Palin, Dowd not 
only challenges Palin’s authenticity as a hunter, she also derides a prac-
tice common among rural Americans. Dowd appears entirely ignorant of 
this milieu, though elsewhere, ironically, she claims her own working-
class roots and criticizes Obama for being elitist.96 
Meanwhile, Frank Rich has ridiculed Palin for suggesting that 
“white rural America actually still was the nation’s baseline.”97 Certainly 
the number of rural Americans is diminishing, down to just about one-
fifth of the population.98 But the impact of voters who are rural within 
any number of states can make a difference not only in the Electoral Col-
lege but also in Senate races and in the balance of power in the House of 
Representatives. Republicans and Tea Partiers have not overlooked these 
voters—and neither did Obama in the 2008 election cycle.99 But while 
rural voters supported Barack Obama in record numbers compared to 
                                                     
 93. Dowd further demonstrates her ignorance of hunting by failing to acknowledge that well-
educated people—probably even some liberal elites and certainly many in the professional-
managerial class—also hunt as a pastime. Where I come from, wealthy professionals travel to south 
and east Arkansas—and beyond—to engage in hunting ducks and other prey, while the less affluent 
working class tend to hunt locally for deer. 
 94. For the record, I have never been deer hunting, though my father went occasionally, and I 
did go fishing a few times as a teenager. My parents gave me a BB gun for my tenth birthday, but I 
only used it for target practice. Soon thereafter, I moved from my tomboy phase into my prissy 
phase. See Pruitt, How You Gonna’ Keep Her Down on the Farm . . ., supra note 8. 
 95. Tamara Keith, For Some Girls, The Ultimate Goal Is to Kill a Buck, NPR, Dec. 9, 2010, 
available at http://www.npr.org/2010/12/09/131390073/for-some-girls-the-ultimate-goal-is-to-kill-a-
buck (featuring 15-year-old Magan Hebert of Wayne County, Mississippi, who has been hunting 
since she was in fourth grade and just shot her first buck, and reporting that “[Hebert’s] family gets 
almost all the red meat it needs for a whole year during hunting season”); see also SHERMAN, supra 
note 4, at 58, 61, 63 (describing the role of hunting as subsistence practice in the rural northern Cali-
fornia community she studied). 
 96. See WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 191 (citing Maureen Dowd, who says she grew up working 
class “in a house with a gun, a strong Catholic faith, an immigrant father, brothers with anti-illegal 
immigrant sentiments and a passion for bowling.” Dowd “reminds us that Obama did not; that his 
mother ‘got her Ph.D. in anthropology, studying the culture of Indonesia. . . . And as Obama has 
courted white, blue-collar voters in “Deer Hunter” and “Rocky” country, he has often appeared to be 
observing the odd habits of the colorful locals.’”). 
 97. Rich, supra note 24. 
 98. Lisa R. Pruitt, The Forgotten Fifth: Rural Youth and Substance Abuse, 20 STAN. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 359 (2009) (citing U.S. Census Bureau); Berg, supra note 26. 
 99. See Berg, supra note 26 (writing, “One group of big-city elites (Republican) is playing 
small-town voters as pawns against another group of big-city elites (Democrat)” and asserting that 
“what was once an authentic expression of populist anger now seems more like a tactical pose”). 
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John Kerry and Al Gore, many have already swung back to supporting 
Republicans, who won big in both state and federal elections in 2010.100 
Of the 60 house seats that swung from Democrat to Republican in the 
2010 mid-term election, two-thirds were among the nation’s 125 most 
rural districts.101 Republicans captured 35 seats in congressional districts 
where the percentage of whites with bachelor’s degrees is below the na-
tional average.102 
So, while progressives may regret and resent it—and while some 
deny it—cultivating the rural vote is not necessarily a waste of time. It 
may, in fact, be a key component of a winning strategy—especially in 
close elections. As one pundit observed in 2008, when it comes to poli-
tics, “Small towns aren’t so small after all.”103 Unfortunately, Republican 
gains in the 2010 mid-term elections may fuel progressives’ ire at rural 
voters. Thus, even if those voters are once again seen to matter, they may 
not garner the sort of attention they deserve if Democrats pout instead of 
enlisting their support. 
It’s difficult to say who started the fight between progressives and 
the white working class, but the rural working class, in particular, have 
taken it on the chin in the context of recent political rhetoric, in part be-
cause they and Palin have claimed one another. I understand that pundits 
are looking for something interesting to say. They want to be clever and 
witty, and the white working class—especially those who are geographi-
cally or culturally rural—have proved irresistible fodder for them.104 In-
deed, rural Americans have become the butt of jokes in ways that would 
be entirely unacceptable for other racial, ethnic, religious, or sexual mi-
norities.105 
                                                     
 100. Brooks, supra note 52. Brooks summarized the 2010 election outcome: “[Democrats] lost 
five House seats in Pennsylvania and another five in Ohio. They lost governorships in Pennsylvania, 
Ohio, Michigan, Wisconsin and Iowa. Republicans gained control of both state legislative houses in 
Ohio, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Indiana and Minnesota.” Id. 
 101. Bill Bishop & Julie Ardery, Republicans Win Rural—and the House, DAILY YONDER, 
(Nov. 4, 2010), http://www.dailyyonder.com/republicans-win-rural-%E2%80%94-and-house/2010/ 
11/03/3022; see also Election Results and Rural Policy, CTR. FOR RURAL AFF. (Dec. 2010), availa-
ble at http://www.cfra.org/node/3109. 
 102. Brooks, supra note 52. 
 103. Berg, supra note 26. 
 104. See BAGEANT, supra note 4, at 103 (“What white middle America loathes these days are 
poor and poorish people, especially the kind who look and sound like they just might live in a house 
trailer.”). 
 105. Williams suggests that they are the only group about whom it is socially acceptable to be 
so derisive. See WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 154. I acknowledge that hateful speech directed at racial 
minorities—in particular blacks—is more problematic than that directed at whites because whites 
enjoy majority status and because of the particularly ugly history of slavery and its enduring legacy. 
See generally MARI J. MATSUDA, CHARLES R. LAWRENCE III, RICHARD DELGADO & KIMBERLE 
WILLIAMS CRENSHAW, WORDS THAT WOUND (1993) (analyzing differences between racially hateful 
speech directed at blacks and that directed at other racial and ethnic groups); Mahoney, supra note 
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Surely in the context of political discourse, the white working class 
deserve to be accorded the same dignity and respect we accord other 
groups. They have “culture” and “identity” too, and as liberals like to 
point out when it suits them, rural whites in particular are no longer a 
majority.106 It’s time for (mostly metropolitan) progressives to take the 
high road and initiate a truce. But before I further discuss urban–rural 
détente, it is useful to explore nuances within the rural working class—
nuances that help us better understand the class culture gap that is fueling 
the culture wars. 
II. CLASS COMPLICATIONS IN RURAL AMERICA: 
THE WELL OFF, THE WORKERS, AND THE WHITE TRASH 
Williams’s discussion of class takes place largely within the 
framework of just two groups—the professional-managerial class and 
what Williams labels the working class. The former are sometimes called 
the upper-middle class and include socially progressive elites, while the 
latter include those sometimes referred to as the Missing Middle.107 
While Williams discusses a number of bases for distinguishing among 
classes and admits that class is a slippery and multi-dimensional con-
cept,108 she uses education level as the primary basis of her classifica-
                                                                                                                       
14, at 813 n.50 (citing Cheryl Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707 (1993)) (dis-
cussing the reasons that “blackness is not the mirror image of whiteness: the reification of whiteness 
reflects centuries of privilege . . . [and] whiteness still exists as an artifact that confers advantages 
over blackness”). But I am not speaking here about a cause of action for racially hateful speech. I am 
talking about civility in public and private discourse. For a discussion of the history of the term 
“white trash” and its racialized connotations, see generally WRAY, supra note 18; see also LANI 
GUINIER & GERALD TORRES: THE MINER’S CANARY: ENLISTING RACE, RESISTING POWER, 
TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY 94 (2003) (referring to rural whites as “raced black or brown” in the 
context of their exclusion from Texas’s flagship universities); WEBB, supra note 22, at 181 (explain-
ing “redneck” as an ethnic slur). 
 106. The broader white working class, however, remain a majority, albeit one with unrealized 
power. See RUY TEIXEIRA & JOEL ROGERS, AMERICA’S FORGOTTEN MAJORITY: WHY THE WHITE 
WORKING CLASS STILL MATTERS (2000). 
 107. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 155–57 (crediting Theda Skocpol for coining the term Missing 
Middle). Williams uses the term “middle class” to refer to those who “have the basics and are neither 
poor nor rich. ‘Middle class’ is best understood as a symbol of arrival rather than a designation of a 
particular demographic group.” Id. at 156. Williams also uses the term “middle class” to refer to “the 
very broad group that sees itself as having achieved access to the core symbols of the settled life: a 
single family house, one car per adult, ownership of major household appliances, and some access to 
consumer goods—at a level defined by one’s friends and neighbors . . . .” Id.; see also Carbone, 
supra note 22 (describing middle-class children as “those who start life without the wealth necessary 
to guarantee an easy future, but sufficient resources to secure a decent living through wise invest-
ment and productive work”). 
 108. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 155–57. Williams acknowledges that she is “describing cul-
tural norms and centers of gravity, not rigid templates to which people conform in lockstep.” Id. at 
156. I borrow the term “slippery” in relation to class from Beverly Skeggs. See BEVERLY SKEGGS, 
CLASS, SELF, CULTURE (2004); BEVERLY SKEGGS, FORMATIONS OF CLASS AND GENDER: 
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tion.109 In particular, those with college degrees are typically in the pro-
fessional-managerial class,110 while those with less education are catego-
rized as working class.111 If it takes a college degree to be in the profes-
sional-managerial class and fewer than 30% of Americans have such a 
                                                                                                                       
BECOMING RESPECTABLE (1997); see also Harris, supra note 22, at 38 (noting the “symbolic and 
material” consequences of class). 
 109. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 161 (following the lead of MICHÈLE LAMONT, THE DIGNITY 
OF WORKING MEN: MORALITY AND THE BOUNDARIES OF RACE, CLASS, AND IMMIGRATION 10 
(2000) who asserts that, “working class is best defined negatively, in opposition to the poor and to 
professionals and managers who have completed college”); see also id. (arguing that “education—
not income—needs to be the relevant proxy for class”; those who are poorly educated tend to be 
socially conservative much more than those with low incomes). 
Joe Bageant offers an alternative definition of the working class—one pegged not to income or 
education, but to power. Nevertheless, he winds up articulating essentially the same class taxonomy 
as Williams. Like her, Bageant challenges the proposition that we are a middle-class nation, assert-
ing, instead, that we are a working-class nation. BAGEANT, supra note 4, at 11. Bageant writes: 
“Class,” however, is defined not in terms of income or degrees but in terms of power. Es-
pecially regarding labor. If you define “working class” in terms of power—bosses who 
have it and workers who don’t—at least 60 percent of America is working class, and the 
true middle class—the journalists, professionals and semiprofessionals, people in the 
management class, etc.—are not more than one-third at best. Leaving aside all numbers, 
“working class” might best be defined like this: You do not have power over your work. 
You do not control when you work, how much you get paid, how fast you work, or 
whether you will be cut loose from your job at the first shiver on Wall Street. “Working 
class” has not a thing to do with the color of your collar and not nearly as much to do 
with income as most people think, or in many cases even with whether you are self-
employed. These days the working class consists of truck drivers, cashiers, electricians, 
medical technicians, and all sorts of people conditioned by our system not to think of 
themselves as working class. There are no clear lines, which is one reason why the delu-
sion of a middle class majority persists. 
Id. at 11–12. Elsewhere Bageant observes that the class war is now being waged between the edu-
cated and uneducated. Id. at 26. Like Bageant, Williams acknowledges the relevance of power to the 
lines between the classes. “People with less education often see professionals as exercising arrogant, 
unchecked power over their lives.” WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 188. Williams’s list of working-class 
occupations is similarly expansive and also disputes the relevance of the white-collar/blue-collar 
divide. Id. at 155–56 (listing both those who sell auto parts and those who make them, nonunionized 
power plant workers, secretaries, hairdressers, receptionists, cashiers, and those in retail sales). 
 110. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 163 (“To get a professional-managerial job, for example, 
requires a degree at a four-year college—the more elite, the better—and often a graduate degree as 
well.”). Bageant refers to this group as “[o]verwhelmingly white and college educated” liberal elites 
who are “comfortably ensconced in the true middle class” and “liv[ing] among clones of them-
selves.” BAGEANT, supra note 4, at 13. 
Williams acknowledges that terminology and definitions vary from class to class. She notes, for 
example, that those the upper-middle class typically refer to as the “working class” often see them-
selves as middle class. That group, in turn, tend to see the upper-middle class as “rich.” WILLIAMS, 
supra note 1, at 156. 
 111. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 161. 
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degree,112 it is easy to conclude that we are, indeed, a nation of work-
ers—or a working-class nation.113 
Williams’s embrace of the term Missing Middle as roughly syn-
onymous with the working class suggests at least two things. First, those 
who like to think of themselves as middle class don’t fit the label very 
well these days because they are in a much less stable fiscal situation 
than were the working-class folks in the post-World War II era; good 
jobs for those without higher education are harder to come by than they 
were just a generation or two ago.114 Thus, we arguably no longer have a 
middle class—at least not a very robust one or one with the financial sta-
bility and safety net previously suggested by the term.115 Second, Wil-
liams uses the term to make the point that academics and policy-makers 
have largely overlooked the middle class, focusing instead on poverty 
and the poor.116 
As a member of the liberal elite who enjoyed an admittedly privi-
leged upbringing,117 Williams acknowledges her awkwardness at discuss-
ing the working class. She refers to the “occupational hazard of writing 
about class”118 and likens it to similar hazards facing politicians who dare 
raise the issue.119 Yet I believe Williams describes the white working 
                                                     
 112. Id. at 164. 
 113. See BAGEANT, supra note 4, at 11 (arguing that we have become a “working-class coun-
try” and that the “true middle class [are] the journalists, professionals and semiprofessionals, people 
in the management class, etc.”). 
 114. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 159. 
 115. A.O. Scott recently expressed the middle class as both all-encompassing and empty: 
The idea of the universal middle class is a pervasive expression of American egalitarian-
ism—and perhaps the only one left. In politics the middle has all but swallowed up the 
ends. Tax cuts aimed at the wealthy and social programs that largely benefit the poor 
must always be presented as, above all, good for the middle class, a group that thus seems 
to include nearly everyone. It is also a group that is, at least judging from the political 
rhetoric of the last 20 years, perennially in trouble: shrinking, forgotten, frustrated, afraid 
of falling down and scrambling to keep up. 
A.O. Scott, Hollywood’s Class Warfare, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2010, at AR1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/26/movies/26scott.html?scp=2&sq=winter%27s%20bone&st=cse. 
 116. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 160–61. 
 117. Id. at 189. 
 118. Id. at 275 n.20. 
 119. Id. at 191. Williams writes, “A presidential candidate should never get into a situation of 
explaining the less privileged to the elite. The risks of sounding condescending are just too large.” 
Id. Bageant observes that politicians are disciplined anytime they hint at the presence of classes. 
“America, as we are so often told, is a classless society. And without classes there can never be a 
class war (which does not prevent any politician who mentions class being accused of fomenting 
one).” BAGEANT, supra note 4, at 101. A recent example of this phenomenon occurred during bipar-
tisan negotiations over whether to extend Bush-era tax cuts. Particularly controversial was whether 
these tax cuts should be extended for earners in the highest income bracket. David Dreier, a Republi-
can of California, expressed amazement “that the Democrats were continuing the same tactics they’d 
used before they were buried by a landslide in November’s House elections.” Andrea Seabrook, 
Negotiators Seek Tax Deal as House Passes Bill, NPR, Dec. 2, 2010, available at 
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class with remarkable sensitivity and compassion.120 Williams’s descrip-
tions of these two broad classes resonate with me as a class migrant,121 as 
one with a foot in both camps. I can see myself in both classes, and I can 
attest to the class conflict within. 
Broadly speaking, I believe Williams’s class taxonomy is accurate 
and helpful, particularly as class relates to political coalition building, 
which is the primary use she makes of it. But Williams’s broad binary 
overlooks some of the class nuance associated with rural and small-town 
America, nuance that may help us understand the class culture gap be-
tween the socially progressive and the supremely enigmatic white non-
metropolitan voter. Nevertheless, another aspect of the class taxonomy 
that Williams articulates can help us understand rural white voters. 
Specifically, within the category “working class,” Williams recog-
nizes a divide between the “settled working class” and the “hard liv-
ing.”122 While the settled working class value stability and routine, order 
and abundance,123 the hard living “tend toward drugs or heavy drinking, 
marital instability, and flightiness.”124 Thus the settled working class are 
roughly synonymous with our vision of what the middle class are or 
should be, while the hard living segment may not be. Rather, this latter 
group spill over into what many would label “working poor.”125 Under-
                                                                                                                       
http://www.npr.org/2010/12/02/131761855/Negotiators-Seek-Tax-Deal-As-House-Passes-Bill. 
Dreier stated, “The standard old class warfare, us versus them, rich versus poor. And I think that all 
we need to do is look at the November 2nd election. There was a rejection of this divisive tone 
which we regularly hear around here—the haves and the have-nots.” Id. 
 120. Bageant, too, writes with extraordinary sensitivity, a feat made easier by his status as a 
class migrant who sees himself as writing about “his people.” Bageant and Williams’s style is in 
sharp contrast to Thomas Frank whose narrative is unrelenting in ridiculing white, working-class 
middle America. 
 121. See supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
 122. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 164–66. 
 123. Id. at 164–65. 
 124. Id. at 165. 
 125. Williams does not use the label “working poor” in this way; she acknowledges the term, 
as defined by Dennis Gilbert, as those whose median income is $12,000. Id. at 155 (citing DENNIS 
GILBERT, THE AMERICAN CLASS STRUCTURE IN AN AGE OF GROWING INEQUALITY 270 (6th ed. 
2003)). Bageant has this to say about the “working-poor whites”: 
Admittedly, my people are a little seedier than most; this is after all the South, albeit the 
northernmost point of the South. But their needs—affordable healthcare, a living wage, 
steady employment, affordable rents, and having some money for retirement—differ 
from those of all working-class Americans only in degree. There is no sharp dividing line 
between the working-poor renters in this neighborhood and the working-class homeown-
ers in the treeless T-board-sided modular home suburbs here and everywhere else. The 
working class here in what they are now calling the “heartland” (all the stuff between the 
big cities) exists on a continuum ranging from complete insecurity to the not-quite-
complete insecurity of having a decent but endangered job. It is a continuum extending 
from the apathy of the poorest to the hard-edged anger of those with more to lose. Which 
ain’t a lot, brother, when your household income hovers around $30,000 or 35,000 with 
both people working. Many are working poor but kid themselves that they are middle 
2011] The Geography of the Class Culture Wars 795 
standing the class culture wars, then, requires us to see at least three 
classes: the professional-managerial class, the settled working class as an 
intermediate group, and the hard living. 
This divide within the broader white working class is significant 
because it helps explain these voters’ attachment to morality and cultural 
issues. As Williams expresses it: 
Understanding the settled working class is impossible without 
an appreciation of the specter of hard living. This specter is what 
anchors working-class culture to stability instead of novelty, to self-
regulation instead of self-actualization. The specter of hard living 
also shapes the moral vision of American workers in ways that fuel 
culture wars.126 
The settled working class fear tumbling down to the next rung of the 
class ladder; they fear becoming hard living—or being perceived as 
such.127 This fear, along with an attendant desire to distinguish them-
selves from the hard living—something they cannot do, for example, on 
the basis of color—influences their politics. Specifically, it leads them to 
focus on work and to see themselves as self-made, self-sufficient, and 
independent from government.128 Work, Williams writes, “signals a form 
of moral purity.”129 Work saves. Williams further notes that both blacks 
and whites within the working class define success more in terms of mo-
                                                                                                                       
class—partly out of pride and partly because of the long-running national lie that most 
Americans are middle class. 
BAGEANT, supra note 4, at 5. 
 126. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 165–66. 
 127. Id. at 164. 
 128. See BAGEANT, supra note 4, at 66–67 (discussing working class voters’ rejection of “en-
titlements” such as unemployment compensation, food stamps, or HeadStart, and their tendency to 
believe they have never benefitted from government spending); id. at 8 (“If you had lived his hard 
working life and had a philosophy of never wanting any handout from the government, you too 
would be conservative. By ‘conservative,’ I do not mean a wild-eye neocon. I mean that you would 
be cautious and traditional enough to vote for the man who looks strong enough to keep housing 
values up, to destroy your unseen enemies abroad, and to give God a voice in national affairs.”); id. 
at 29–30 (“Most working people around here believe in the buzz phrase ‘personal responsibility.’ 
Their daddies and mamas taught them to accept responsibility for their actions. They assume respon-
sibility for their lives and don’t want a handout from the government. They see accepting public help 
as a sign of failure and moral weakness. Consequently, they don’t like social spending to give people 
a lift. But self-reliant as they are, what real chance do they have living on wages that do not allow 
them to accumulate savings? What chance do they have living from paycheck to paycheck, praying 
there will be no layoffs at J.C. Penney or Toll Brothers Homes or Home Depot?”); see also WEBB, 
supra note 22, at 161, 180, 182, 289 (discussing the fiercely independent history of the Scots-Irish, 
from whom many white working-class folks, especially those in the rural South, are descendents). 
 129. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 178 (quoting LAMONT, supra note 109, at 24). 
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rality than in terms of socioeconomic achievement.130 I contend that they 
arguably have little choice, given that the latter is so much farther from 
their reach. 
Race is relevant to all of this in several ways, one partly captured 
by Joe Bageant: “[T]he myth of the power of white skin endures, and so 
does the unspoken belief that if a white person does not succeed, his or 
her lack of success can be due only to laziness.”131 The settled working 
class attribute the failures of the hard living to laziness. But the profes-
sional-managerial class are also influenced by this white skin myth, for 
                                                     
 130. Id. at 157 (citing LAMONT, supra note 109, at 10); see also SHERMAN, supra note 4, at 9 
(noting that “the poor may focus on the moral value of hard work, but perhaps see it as divorced 
somewhat from economic rewards”). 
 131. BAGEANT, supra note 4, at 9. The “myth of the power of white skin” might be seen as a 
downside to liberal elites’ acknowledgement of their white privilege. That is, if white social progres-
sives fail to see the limits of white privilege for those who are socioeconomically disadvantaged, 
they may see white skin as having more significant material benefit than it does. Indeed, at least one 
item on Peggy McIntosh’s list of white privilege indicators has always struck me as profoundly 
incorrect: “If I should need to move, I can be pretty sure of renting or purchasing housing in an area, 
which I can afford and in which I would want to live.” Peggy McIntosh, White Privilege: Unpacking 
the Invisible Knapsack, N.Y. MODEL FOR BATTERER PROGRAM (1988), available at 
http://www.nymbp.org/reference/WhitePrivilege.pdf. In fact, many working-class whites cannot 
afford to live where they want, and they may not like where they are forced to live. Recall that “trai-
ler trash” is generally synonymous with “white trash.” See WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 154; see also, 
e.g.,Katherine MacTavish, Michelle Eley, & Sonya Salamon, Housing Vulnerability Among Rural 
Trailer-Park Households, 13 GEO. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 95, 95 (2006) (noting that in the 1990s, 
“the number of manufactured homes in nonmetro places grew by 25% to represent 16% of all own-
er-occupied rural housing stock”). In any event, I doubt Peggy McIntosh grew up working class or, 
worse yet, poor. White privilege is powerful indeed, but it does not mean that all white people have 
easier lives than all people of color. White privilege certainly doesn’t mean that white workers have 
an easy life. They are struggling against many of the same barriers to socioeconomic success that 
hinder racial and ethnic minorities. Understanding and acknowledging the limits of white privi-
lege—which may be particularly anemic in all-white, socioeconomically disadvantaged communi-
ties—would facilitate awareness of the structural and cultural obstacles that keep the white working 
class socially and economically immobile. See Lisa R. Pruitt, “Winter’s Bone” and the Limits of 
White Privilege (Part I), SALTLAW BLOG, (Aug. 17, 2010), http://www.saltlaw.org/ 
blog/2010/08/17/winters-bone-and-the-limits-of-white-privilege/; Lisa R. Pruitt, “Winter’s Bone” 
and the Limits of White Privilege (Part II), SALTLAW BLOG, (Aug. 26, 2010), 
http://www.saltlaw.org/blog/2010/08/26/winters-bone-and-the-limits-of-white-privilege-part-ii/. For 
further discussion of the role of white privilege and male privilege in the work-family debate, see 
Robert S. Chang, Joan Williams, Coalitions, and Getting Beyond the Wages of Whiteness and the 
Wages of Maleness, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 825 (2011). 
Of course, race is relevant in other ways, too. As bell hooks expresses it: 
Racial solidarity, particularly the solidarity of whiteness, has historically always been used to 
obscure class, to make the white poor see their interests as one with the world of white privi-
lege. Similarly, the black poor have always been told that class can never matter as much as 
race. 
HOOKS, supra note 22, at 5. She goes on to assert, “Nowadays the black and white poor know better. 
They are not so easily duped by an appeal to unquestioned racial identification and solidarity, but 
they are still uncertain about what all of the changes mean . . . .” Id. at 5–6. I hope she is right about 
the “knowing better” part. 
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they tend to see the white working class as lazy—and dumb.132 While the 
professional-managerial class can distinguish themselves by education, 
income, and various associated cultural trappings,133 these—like race—
are not available as sources of distinction among working-class whites, 
who must find other grounds for setting themselves apart from whites 
one rung down the class ladder. For the settled working class, that basis 
is often morality—and it is a morality grounded significantly in work. 
Each group thus differentiates itself from the group beneath. The broader 
class culture wars between the professional-managerial class and the 
working class are thus being fueled by a second class war—a war within 
the working class. But the professional-managerial class are oblivious to 
this secondary class war and thus fail to grasp why moral and associated 
cultural issues are so important to the working class. 
Rural Americans would probably recognize those whom Williams 
describes as the settled working class and the hard living, but they might 
assign them different labels. First, reflecting the hard times associated 
with most rural and nonmetropolitan economies,134 rural workers might 
                                                     
 132. See WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 154 (citing studies showing that the professional-
managerial class link the white working class to laziness); SHERMAN, supra note 4, at 185–86 (ob-
serving the irony that many see the poor as lacking work ethic and as “lazy, deviant, oppositional, 
and dependent”). 
 133. Recall Williams’s discussion of “understated clothes, educational travel, and our teeny 
tiny portions of food . . . .” WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 212. Angela Harris similarly observes the 
significance of symbolic markers of taste to class distinctions, noting that taste “has a lot to do with 
consumption.” Harris, supra note 22, at 41; see also BAGEANT, supra note 4, at 115 (describing 
“buying and squirreling away more meaningless junk”); HOOKS, supra note 22, at 6 (writing that 
“[c]onsumer culture silences working people and the middle classes” who are “busy buying or plan-
ning to buy”). 
 134. The rural poverty rate consistently exceeds the urban poverty rate. The most recent pover-
ty statistics released by the U.S. government, for 2009, indicate a 16.6% poverty rate for nonmetro 
residents and a 13.9% rate for their metro counterparts. Rural Income, Poverty and Welfare: Poverty 
Geography, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. ECON. RESEARCH SERV. (Oct. 6, 2010), http://www.ers. 
usda.gov/Briefing/IncomePovertyWelfare/PovertyGeography.htm. In addition, of 386 persistent 
poverty counties (those with poverty rates in excess of 20% in each of the last four decennial cen-
suses), 340 counties are nonmetropolitan, constituting 13% of all micropolitan counties and 18% of 
all other nonmetropolitan counties. Only 4% of metropolitan counties are designated persistent po-
verty counties. Id. The vast majority of persistent poverty counties (280) are in the South. Id. 
Further, median earnings are lower in rural places than in urban places. The median earnings for 
the rural population twenty-five years of age and older is $32,711, while the median earnings for 
their urban counterparts is $34,624. American FactFinder, Educational Attainment, 2005–2009 
American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://factfinder.census.gov 
(search “S1501”). According to a 2008 report of the Carsey Institute, the annual earnings gap be-
tween rural and urban families has widened in the past forty years. In 1969 the earnings gap between 
married couples was $13,000, whereas by 2006 it had risen to $19,000. KRISTIN SMITH, CARSEY 
INST., WORKING HARD FOR THE MONEY: TRENDS IN WOMEN’S EMPLOYMENT 1970 TO 2007, at 3 
(2008), available at http://carseyinstitute.unh.edu/publications/Report-Smith-WorkingHard.pdf. 
Finally, the education gap between rural and urban populations has widened dramatically in recent 
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be more likely to acknowledge their status as working class than to iden-
tify with the broad middle class.135 Williams observes that “academics 
often confuse the ‘working class’ with low-income Americans,”136 but in 
nonmetropolitan America, the working class are “low-income” Ameri-
cans—at least by my estimation of what constitutes a low income.137 
Many rural Americans who work are, in fact, working poor.138 
Second, rural Americans would more likely embrace the dichotomy 
expressed in the title of Jennifer Sherman’s book, Those Who Work, 
Those Who Don’t: Poverty, Morality, and Family in Rural America. 
Sherman’s 2009 book presents an ethnography of a white working-class 
town—an ethnography like those that Williams uses to make her points 
about the class culture wars. But Sherman’s ethnography is different in 
that it provides a distinctly rural perspective on the class war raging with-
in the broad working class. Within rural communities, the closest analo-
gue to the settled working class in Williams’s dichotomy are “those who 
work,” even if some in the category don’t work as regularly or in jobs as 
secure as those enjoyed by Williams’s settled working class.139 These 
workers distinguish themselves from those who don’t work or who work 
even less regularly, who are roughly analogous to the hard living in Wil-
liams’s taxonomy. As with the efforts of the settled working class to dif-
ferentiate themselves from the hard living, morality is key for those who 
                                                                                                                       
years. See generally PATRICK J. CARR & MARIA J. KEFALAS, HOLLOWING OUT THE MIDDLE: THE 
RURAL BRAIN DRAIN AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR AMERICA (2009); BISHOP, supra note 6, at 131–32. 
 135. But see BAGEANT, supra note 4, at 15 (writing of those “whose kids’ high school trip is to 
Iraq, who are two paydays away from homelessness yet in their pride cling to the notion that they are 
middle-class Americans”). 
 136. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 156. 
 137. Joe Bageant offers this description of those I see as the nonmetropolitan equivalent of 
Williams’s settled working class: 
Calling them poor would not be quite accurate, unless you used net worth as a gauge of 
prosperity. Then they would be worse than poor because poor is zero, and owing hun-
dreds of thousands with no chance of ever paying it off is below the zero mark. But debt 
and poverty have no relationship in the American scheme of things, so let’s just call 
[these people] “poorish”—outwardly comfortable people who could be homeless next 
month. 
BAGEANT, supra note 4, at 103. He elsewhere points out that liberal elites, when they recognize 
members of this class at all, tend not to see that they are struggling. Id. at 7. 
 138. See SMITH, supra note 134, at 18–19. But see Sabrina Tavernise, Ohio Town Sees Public 
Job as Only Route to Middle Class, N.Y. TIMES, March 15, 2011, http://www.ny 
times.com/2011/03/16/us/16ohio.html?_r=1&hpw (featuring a nonmetropolitan, working-class 
couple who together earned $63,000 per year working as a janitor and a sewer manager in the public 
sector). Of the working poor, Bageant writes, “Poor is poor, whether you have to work for your 
poverty or not.” BAGEANT, supra note 4, at 9 (suggesting that the “distinction between poor and 
working poor may well be a meaningless moral distinction shaped by the Protestant work ethic”). 
 139. See SHERMAN, supra note 4, at 97–98. 
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work, and they often cast their moral superiority as grounded in their 
work ethic.140 
Observing that “[m]oral discourses focused around work ethics are 
generally the most powerful” among various moral discourses,141 Sher-
man notes that moral ideas such as those associated with work “frequent-
ly become most important when other status markers are unattainable or 
unusable.”142 This is particularly relevant to rural communities that are 
largely racially and ethnically homogeneous or where few other status 
markers are available or evident. Sherman expands on the significance of 
homogeneity, explaining that when “combined with other cultural norms 
or social needs that encourage it, [homogeneity] can cause morality to 
develop a crucial role in the social life of many different types of Ameri-
can communities.”143 Sherman illustrates the point by reference to “Gol-
den Valley,” the northern California community she studied: 
In this context economic distinctions are fading in importance, as so 
few people have access to jobs that pay well or have any real securi-
ty. Ethnic or racial distinctions are also scarce; being white, in and 
of itself, goes only so far as a form of distinction in Golden Valley, 
since most everyone there is white. Similarly, given its cultural ho-
mogeneity and almost complete lack of access to high culture mark-
ers, culture also provides little by way of social distinction between 
community members and serves rather as a source of cohesion. As 
poor rural whites in a community of poor rural whites, they are li-
mited in their sources of distinction. But like people in all societies, 
they still desire to organize themselves into social groups and some 
sort of hierarchy. Morality is one of the few remaining axes upon 
which to base this hierarchy. When jobs, incomes, and other sources 
                                                     
 140. See id. at 4–5 (calling morality “more than a set of values based on culturally shared be-
liefs; it is a force that actively structures social life and the social hierarchy of the community”); id. 
at 7–8 (quoting ANDREW SAYER, THE MORAL SIGNIFICANCE OF CLASS 167 (2005)) (discussing 
morality as not necessarily grounded in religion but “as grounded in the social psychology of emo-
tional responses as evaluative judgments”); see also BAGEANT, supra note 4, at 75 (discussing how 
those who had factory jobs when they represented more secure, regular work now judge those who 
“drift from job to job” as “dregs”). Others have observed the significance of work and morality in 
rural communities in other nations. See, e.g., Pini et al., supra note 42, at 23–24 (suggesting a dis-
tinction between those who work and those who don’t). 
 141. SHERMAN, supra note 4, at 8. 
 142. Id. at 6. (“As a nation, we seldom acknowledge the degree to which our culture is built 
upon an extremely moralistic set of doctrines, particularly the belief in the moral value of hard work 
and the doctrine of individual achievement. Such ideas as the individual’s personal and moral re-
sponsibility for his or her own success or failure permeate our culture and our worldview.”). 
 143. Id. at 7. 
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of identity are stripped away, it is still possible to find ways to de-
fine themselves . . . as morally upstanding.144 
Homogeneity in rural communities is often heightened by the stasis and 
attachment to place that tend to characterize rural places.145 
Like Williams and Sherman, Joe Bageant identifies work as a key 
source of morality for the white working class, but he expresses the sit-
uation in rather more blunt terms, invoking the difference between what 
he calls the “American redneck” and “white trash.”146 Bageant summa-
rizes: 
Life is about work for the American redneck. . . . For all these 
people work is an obsession and has been for generations stretching 
back to the textile mills, the homesteads of the West and Midwest, 
the immigrant labor mines of West Virginia and Colorado and Mon-
tana, the subsistence farms of the South. The forebears of today’s 
rednecks were people for whom not working meant their families 
would starve. Literally. So the work ethic is burned into their genet-
ic code. (Incidentally, I am not talking about white trash here. I am 
talking about rednecks, the difference being that rednecks work 
themselves to death and will never accept a handout. White trash 
folks do not have the same hang-up.) In the redneck mind, lazy is 
the worst thing a person can be—worse than dumb, drunk or mean, 
worse than being a liar and a jailbird or crazy. The absolute worst 
thing that a redneck can say about anyone is: “He doesn’t want to 
work . . . .”147 
Similarly, Sherman notes that within Golden Valley, work as a marker of 
morality was so important that failure to work was considered tanta-
                                                     
 144. Id. at 6; see also id. at 5 (discussing the constant process by which humans differentiate 
themselves from one another; noting the universality of the “need to consolidate a sense of self 
through the creation of social boundaries”). 
 145. Pruitt, supra note 5, at 353–56. 
 146. BAGEANT, supra note 4, at 69–70; see also SHERMAN, supra note 4, at 4. 
 147. BAGEANT, supra note 4, at 69–70. I cannot resist sharing my mother’s frequent comment 
about individuals in our community who did not meet her high standards for work ethic, “He’s too 
lazy to eat all he wants.” 
Williams also refers to white trash and suggests that it may be synonymous with hard living. 
WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 165 (citing MARIA KEFALAS, WORKING CLASS HEROES: PROTECTING 
HOME, COMMUNITY, AND NATION IN A CHICAGO NEIGHBORHOOD 21 (2003)). In addition, Williams 
quotes those who have used the term in relation to the broader working class. Id. at 154 (citing 
MICHAEL ZWEIG, WHAT’S CLASS GOT TO DO WITH IT?: AMERICAN SOCIETY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY 166 (2004)) (discussing, in the education setting, how professors see working-class 
whites); see also id. at 188 (regarding working-class attitudes toward professionals). These examples 
suggest that working-class people believe liberal elites and social progressives view them very nega-
tively, as white trash. These uses of such a clearly pejorative term suggest that working-class folks 
perceive liberal elites as unaware of the difference between those who work and those who don’t, 
between the settled working class and the hard living. In sum, the working class believe that the 
professional-managerial class do not understand how hardworking the working class are. 
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mount to drug use and alcoholism as manifestations of moral turpi-
tude.148 Indeed, in the rural context, Sherman observed a hierarchy 
among forms of government assistance: unemployment benefits and dis-
ability assistance were viewed with less obloquy than welfare benefits 
because the former are linked to past work and therefore a “symbolic 
work ethic.”149 
Interestingly, President Obama has shown a striking awareness of 
class as it plays out in racially homogeneous, small towns. In his 1995 
autobiography, Dreams from My Father: A Story of Race and Inherit-
ance, Obama described the Kansas towns where his maternal grandpa-
rents grew up. Referring to their stories as the basis of his musing, Ob-
ama wrote: 
[Y]ou had to listen carefully to recognize the subtle hierarchies and 
unspoken codes that had policed their early lives, the distinctions of 
people who don’t have a lot and live in the middle of nowhere. It 
had to do with something called respectability—there were respect-
able people and not-so-respectable people—and although you didn’t 
have to be rich to be respectable, you sure had to work harder at it if 
you weren’t.150 
Obama’s attention to subtle hierarchies based on respectability in small-
town, middle America is similar to what Sherman, Willliams, and Ba-
geant all observe: When few bases exist for differentiating among out-
wardly homogeneous groups—in this case, white workers in an all-white 
community—people cling to subtle differences, to “symbolic bounda-
ries.”151 
Thus in both the broader (but perhaps implicitly urban) context that 
Williams describes and in the rural milieu that is the subject of Sher-
man’s study and implicitly of Bageant’s book, work is a badge of virtue. 
In both contexts, a group or class whose economic status is frighteningly 
precarious (whether we call them the settled working class, those who 
work, or rednecks) essentially salve an unacknowledged wound by vigo-
                                                     
 148. SHERMAN, supra note 4, at 83–96, 120–26. 
 149. Id. at 70, 68–71 (also noting the ways in which these different categories of benefits are 
constructed as masculine and feminine). 
 150. OBAMA, supra note 64, at 13. Obama also noted the historical context in which he wrote, 
describing it as “a time when hardship, the great leveler that had brought people closer together, was 
shared by all.” Id.; see also Edward R. Morris, The “Hidden Injuries” of Class and Gender among 
Rural Teenagers, in RESHAPING GENDER & CLASS IN RURAL SPACES (Barbara Pini & Belinda Leach 
eds., forthcoming 2011) (telling the story of Kaycee, a rural teenage girl whose family had a bad 
reputation, working hard to rise above her family’s lack of respectability). 
 151. SHERMAN, supra note 4, at 9. Pierre Bourdieu makes the same point: “Social identity lies 
in difference, and difference is asserted against what is closest, which represents the greatest threat.” 
PIERRE BOURDIEU, DISTINCTION: A SOCIAL CRITIQUE OF THE JUDGEMENT OF TASTE 479 (Richard 
Nice trans., 1984) (1979). 
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rously distinguishing themselves from a group who are even worse off 
(whether we call them the hard living, those who don’t work, or white 
trash). When it comes to status and well-being, I can only revert to 
cliché: it’s all relative. Or, to quote the colloquial Bageant, “[H]uman 
nature being what it is, we are all kicking someone else’s dog around, 
whether we admit it or not.”152 Ironically, progressives’ eye-rolling at the 
white working class only enhances the desire of this intermediate class to 
claim for themselves middle-class status, to differentiate themselves 
from the hard living, barely working, and others this class see as the true 
hoi polloi. 
Moreover, while liberal elites muster sympathy for racial and ethnic 
minorities and sometimes for poor whites, they look past the struggles of 
the working class.153 They hold immigrants up as models of industry—
and rightfully so—even as they fail to acknowledge the industry and re-
sourcefulness of the white working class.154 As Williams writes, social 
progressives tend to promote programs to assist have-nots, even as they 
look past the have-a-littles.155 For the work-identified intermediate class, 
nothing could be more infuriating. 
Just as the professional-managerial class fail to see the working 
class accurately, most urban liberal elites fail to see rural workers beyond 
the caricature of the God-fearing deer hunter suggested by the title of Joe 
Bageant’s book. We have become such an urban nation, not only in sheer 
numbers but also in terms of a metro-normative perspective, that we 
                                                     
 152. BAGEANT, supra note 4, at 103. 
 153. I am reminded of this line from President Obama’s famous “race speech” of March 18, 
2008: “Most working- and middle-class white Americans don’t feel that they have been particularly 
privileged by their race. Their experience is the immigrant experience—as far as they’re concerned, 
no one handed them anything. They built it from scratch. They’ve worked hard all their lives . . . .” 
President Barak Obama, A More Perfect Union (Mar. 18, 2008) (transcript available at 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=88478467). Of course, these citizens have 
received the benefit of government programs from the taxes they have paid, though they may not see 
this. BAGEANT, supra note 4, at 67 (referring to a man who “thinks he has never benefited from the 
commonweal because he has never been on welfare”); id. at 72 (observing how upsetting predictions 
of the impending death of Social Security are for the working class, though they would “never admit 
it openly because, well, it’s a handout. An entitlement.”). 
Whites have also—to greatly varying degrees—been the beneficiaries of white privilege. See, e.g., 
Harris, supra note 105, at 1709; Mahoney, supra note 14, at 811, 813. 
 154. Interestingly, Bageant asserts that Anglo workers do not appear to be resentful of the 
Latino/a laborers with whom they compete in some ways for jobs. BAGEANT, supra note 4, at 58; see 
also Lisa R. Pruitt, Latina/os, Locality, and Law in the Rural South, 12 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 135, 
149–50 (2009) (discussing the movie Morristown: In the Air and Sun, which depicts Latinos and 
Anglos cooperating to unionize a poultry processing plant in Tennessee). 
 155. See WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 207. Joe Bageant similarly observes that liberal elites do 
not recognize the struggles of the working class when they see them. BAGEANT, supra note 4, at 7 
(“When the middle-class citizens of Winchester or of the new suburbs of America—the 20 percent 
or so of Americans whose lives most closely resemble media images of the middle class—do cross 
paths with these struggling workers, they do not often recognize them as struggling.”). 
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don’t see—indeed, it seems we sometimes refuse to see—America’s ru-
ral forgotten fifth and how many of them live. Fewer and fewer of us 
have lived rural lives or had significant rural experiences.156 For rural 
Americans, then, spatial distance aggravates the social distance that rele-
gates the entire working class to the peripheral vision of policy-makers 
and reform-minded elites.157 
This brings us, finally, to the nonmetropolitan analogue to Wil-
liams’s professional-managerial class, which I will simply call “well 
off.” First, few, if any, liberal elites live in most rural communities, ex-
cepting those that are college towns or are undergoing rural gentrifica-
tion.158 When members of the professional-managerial class are present 
in nonmetropolitan communities, they are unlikely to be socially pro-
gressive.159 Some will be locally grown professionals who are culturally 
very much like their families of origin, in spite of their access to higher 
education. Others will be local entrepreneurs160 who, whether educated 
or not, are likely to have a small-business, anti-government mentality.161 
                                                     
 156. RURAL SOCIAL WORK PRACTICE, at xv (Nancy Lohmann & Roger A. Lohmann eds., 
2005) (tracking the transition of the United States from rural to urban); see also Silver, supra note 
48; Pruitt, Rural Rhetoric, supra note 8, at 164–65 (observing that the only rural America many now 
know is what they see as they drive between cities). 
 157. This is somewhat ironic since so many social progressives wear their own middle-class 
backgrounds as badges of virtue, suggesting that they understand class boundaries because they have 
transcended them in some measure. See Dowd, supra note 96; Friedman, supra note 33; Frank Rich, 
Op-Ed., White Like Me, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2009, at WK14, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/18/opinion/18rich.html?scp=11&sq=school+op-ed+election&st= 
nyt. The difference, of course, may be that when these baby boomers were growing up middle class 
in different parts of the country (all urban, I might add), being middle class was a much more secure 
place to be than it is now. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 159 (discussing diminishing affluence and 
stability of the middle class over time). For further discussion of the growing income gap between 
classes and economic instability of the middle class, particularly in relation to the work-family de-
bate, see Kessler, supra note 9, at 699–700. 
 158. See sources cited supra note 5, especially HAMILTON ET AL.; see also NINA GLASGOW & 
DAVID L. BROWN, GREY GOLD: DO OLDER IN-MIGRANTS BENEFIT RURAL COMMUNITIES?, CARSEY 
INST. (Fall 2008), available at http://www.carseyinstitute.unh.edu/publications/PB-Glasgow-Brown-
GreyGold.pdf. 
 159. See Morris, supra note 150 (disputing the myth of rural classlessness). 
 160. BAGEANT, supra note 4, at 42 (citing the example of real estate agents and developers); id. 
at 72 (noting that workers express disdain for “weirdo university professors, union racketeers, and 
the rich California ACLU types. People who never worked for a living” and blame them for the 
changed economic landscape for American workers). As several commentators have observed, the 
working class tend to admire entrepreneurs such as small business owners, even as they resent the 
well-educated. See Brooks, supra note 52, at 1 (writing of workers in the Midwest that “disdain Wall 
Street but admire capitalism”). 
 161. BAGEANT, supra note 4, at 28–29 (referring to “a local network of moneyed families, 
bankers, developers, lawyers, and businesspeople” who do not invest in quality of life except for 
their own; asserting that these “Main Street pickle vendors” are a “business cartel” who support “low 
taxes, few or no local regulations, no unions” and who control “most elected offices and municipal 
boards”). 
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In short, the upper crust in rural communities may be more affluent than 
their fellow townspeople—and sometimes also more educated—but they 
do not necessarily have socially and economically progressive views. 
Nonmetropolitan workers thus view these local elites principally in terms 
of their (relative) wealth, tending to admire and envy them while not 
clashing with them politically.162 
What we have in nonmetropolitan communities, then, are essential-
ly three classes. A few people are well off, many are workers, and some 
are considered white trash—a category defined primarily by failure to 
work or perceived laziness. Each class judges the next class down, seek-
ing bases for differentiation. But a broader geographic dynamic is also 
increasingly in play—one whereby the urban disdain the rural. As I dis-
cuss in Part IV, greater familiarity between the professional-managerial 
and working classes, as well as between rural and urban, may be a neces-
sary initial step toward a more robust and diverse coalition for progres-
sive change. 
III. POLITICS, POLICY, AND WORK-FAMILY STRUGGLES 
IN RURAL AMERICA 
It is no coincidence that the working class are often associated with 
small towns and rural places. In fact, many of the very voters who most 
puzzle socially progressive law and policy-makers do live in nonmetro-
politan America. Enigmatic and uncouth as these voters often seem to 
liberal elites, they do pay taxes (on their typically paltry incomes and 
low-value land holdings), and they have needs as working families and, 
more generally, as citizens. Just as Williams calls us to reach out to the 
broader working class, we should reach out to rural voters and invite 
them into a broader and more progressive political coalition. We should 
do so not only for the benefit of the greater, collective good, but also in 
order to better address the particular needs of rural and small-town work-
ers, their families, and their communities. 
Rural families are arguably the very quintessence of Williams’s 
composite portrait of working-class families, not a great surprise given 
that most rural families are working class. Williams notes, for example, 
working-class families’ reliance on and preference for personal networks 
to provide child care,163 as well as their closer social and spatial links to 
                                                     
 162. Id.; see also generally DAVID CAY JOHNSTON, PERFECTLY LEGAL: THE COVERT 
CAMPAIGN TO RIG OUR TAX SYSTEM TO BENEFIT THE SUPER RICH—AND CHEAT EVERYBODY ELSE 
(2003) (discussing how the working class tend to follow the political lead of local elites). 
 163. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 207 (noting that many can only afford inexpensive franchised 
centers and moreover experience anxiety about “strangers” taking care of their children, leading to a 
negative opinion of the “McCenters”; expressing a preference for neighbors to watch their children, 
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family.164 Williams also observes that “elites are more likely than work-
ers to hire help versus turning to family or neighbors.”165 Like the broad-
er working class, rural families have long been associated with networks 
of kith and kin and with the informal economy.166 In short, differences 
Williams identifies with the working class, rural sociologists have histor-
ically identified with rural families. 
Mobility is another issue for working-class and rural families. 
While those in the professional-managerial class may take geographical 
mobility “for granted as a necessary part of American life,”167 rural resi-
dents are associated with immobility. Mobility is typically lacking be-
cause population churn tends to be low in rural communities, due to a 
lack of transferrable social and human capital and an intergenerational 
attachment to place.168 
Meanwhile, rural economists associate rural labor markets with 
sparse, scattered, and low paying jobs and, more recently, with a prolife-
ration of contingent work.169 Rural workers’ commutes may be equally 
as burdensome as those of suburbanites and exurbanites dealing with 
                                                                                                                       
which feels like a “natural extension of the reciprocal relationships”); see also SHERMAN, supra note 
4, at 185. 
 164. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 169 (quoting MARJORIE L. DEVAULT, FEEDING THE FAMILY: 
THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF CARING AS GENDERED WORK 206 (1991) (“[W]orking-class fami-
lies live relatively close to their relatives and spend a large part of their social time with kin.”) & 
ANNETTE LAREAU, UNEQUAL CHILDHOODS: CLASS, RACE, AND FAMILY LIFE 57 (2003) (“[Adults] 
speak daily with their brothers and sisters and their parents. Cousins play together several times a 
week.”)). 
 165. Id. 
 166. See generally Lisa R. Pruitt, Rural Families and Work-Family Issues, SLOAN WORK & 
FAM. ENCYCLOPEDIA (2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=11175
80; SMITH, supra note 134, at 12. 
 167. SHERMAN, supra note 4, at 184–85; see also Berg, supra note 26 (quoting CHRISTOPHER 
LASCH, THE REVOLT OF THE ELITES 5–6 (1995) (“Success has never been so widely associated with 
mobility . . . . Ambitious people understand that a migratory way of life is the price of getting ahead. 
It is a price they gladly pay, since they associate the idea of home with intrusive relatives and neigh-
bors, small-minded gossip, and hidebound conventions. The new elites are in revolt against ‘Middle 
America,’ as they imagine it: technologically backward, politically reactionary, repressive in its 
sexual morality, middlebrow in its tastes, smug and complacent, dull and dowdy.”)). 
 168. Pruitt, supra note 5, at 355, 372; SHERMAN, supra note 4, at 184. 
 169. Diane K. McLaughlin & Alisha J. Coleman-Jensen, Nonstandard Employment in the 
Nonmetropolitan United States, 73 RURAL SOC. 631 (2008) (documenting the extent to which non-
metro workers are involved in contingent work, part-time work, variable-hour work, or are otherwise 
without healthcare insurance and other benefits associated with good jobs); Pruitt, supra note 5, at 
350–51; Robert Gibbs, Lorin Kusmin & John Cromartie, Low-Skill Jobs: A Shrinking Share of the 
Rural Economy, AMBER WAVES, 38 (Nov. 2004), available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/ 
AmberWaves/November04/Features/lowskilljobs.htm (reporting most low-skill jobs in rural areas 
are in the service sector). 
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urban sprawl,170 if not more so. Compared to their urban counterparts, 
however, rural parents have fewer options for employment, transporta-
tion, and child care.171  
In light of pervasive economic restructuring of recent decades, it 
should come as no surprise that rural families, like working-class fami-
lies generally,172 are not truly static. They may desire stasis, but they 
have absorbed enormous economic and social change over the past few 
decades.173 Most notably, rural women now work outside the home at the 
same rate as their urban counterparts.174 Indeed, rural mothers have 
worked outside the home at rates higher than urban mothers for several 
decades.175 As a related matter, the percentage of female-headed house-
holds is now on par across the rural–urban axis.176 Yet rural women earn 
                                                     
 170. See Katharine B. Silbaugh, Sprawl, Family Rhythms, and the Four-Day Work Week, 42 
CONN. L. REV. 1267 (2010); Katharine B. Silbaugh, Women’s Place: Urban Planning, Housing 
Design, and Work-Family Balance, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1797 (2007). 
 171. See KRISTIN SMITH, EMPLOYMENT RATES HIGHER AMONG RURAL MOTHERS THAN 
URBAN MOTHERS, CARSEY INST. (Fall 2007), available at http://www.carseyinstitute.unh.edu/ 
publications/FS_ruralmothers_07.pdf (discussing the need for better child-care options for rural 
families). See generally Pruitt, supra note 166. 
 172. See Carbone, supra note 22 (documenting changes in both working-class families and 
those with more educated parents, all over the past half century). 
 173. SHERMAN, supra note 4, at 184 (discussing the economic restructuring of Golden Valley, 
which caused its residents to move only to return because they “hated the unfamiliar places, they 
couldn’t afford to buy houses in more competitive markets, and they missed their families back 
home.” Once back, however, they faced “severe reductions in their family incomes and the loss of 
essential benefits”); SMITH, supra note 134, at 12 (discussing the impact of rural restructuring on 
women’s work); Pruitt, supra note 5, at 378–82 (summarizing many studies of the gender conse-
quences of rural economic restructuring). 
 174. See SMITH, supra note 171, at 1 fig.1 (reporting that in 2004, 69% of rural mothers with 
children under the age of six were employed, compared to 63% of their urban counterparts; 46% of 
rural mothers with less than a high-school education were employed, compared to 41% of urban 
mothers with that education level; 84% of rural mothers with a college degree were employed, com-
pared to 72% of urban mothers who had college degrees). Indeed, rural mothers have had higher 
employment rates than urban mothers for the past twenty-five years. These higher rural employment 
rates are linked to the higher level of rural poverty. In 2004, 24% of rural mothers with young child-
ren lived in poverty, while the rate for urban women with young children was 20%. Id. at 2. Rural 
mothers who have not completed high school earn on average $13,200, while urban women with the 
same level of education earn $16,600. Id. Rural women who are not mothers, however, tend to be 
employed at lower rates than their urban counterparts. Id. 
As for the argument that this difference is offset by the lower cost of living in rural places, see 
Mark Nord, Does it Cost Less to Live in Rural Areas? Evidence from New Data on Food Security 
and Hunger, 65 RURAL SOC. 104 (2000) (noting that while housing costs tend to be lower in rural 
areas, the cost of other necessities tend to be higher). But see Dean Jolliffe, The Cost of Living and 
the Geographic Distribution of Poverty, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. ECON. RES. SERV. (2006), 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Publications/ERR26/ (suggesting that poverty measures be adjusted to 
account for cost-of-living differences between metro and nonmetro areas, which would cause metro 
poverty levels to be greater than nonmetro levels between 1991 and 2002). 
 175. SMITH, supra note 171, at 1 fig.1 (showing data for 1979, 1989, 1999, and 2004). 
 176. Pruitt, supra note 5, at 356 n.98 (citing Daniel Lichter & Leif Jensen, Rural America in 
Transition: Poverty and Welfare at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century, in RURAL DIMENSIONS OF 
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less than their urban counterparts and are generally more vulnerable fi-
nancially because rural economies lack diversity, and educational oppor-
tunities are limited. To use Williams’s terminology, rural mothers are 
more likely to be “one sick child away from being fired”177 than to be 
joining the “opt-out revolution.”178 
The structural and cultural characteristics that distinguish rural live-
lihood are typically overlooked by law and policy-makers, although they 
profoundly influence work-family relations and the well-being of rural 
residents more broadly. One law that proved especially ill fitting for rural 
populations was welfare reform. People can’t go to work if there are no 
jobs, or—where jobs do exist—if no transportation is available to get 
them to the jobs. Yet the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Recon-
ciliation Act overlooked these rather critical factors, limiting the period 
during which a family could receive welfare benefits and forcing parents 
of young children into the workforce, even absent affordable, adequate 
child care.179 By the same token, raising the national retirement age may 
make sense for knowledge workers but is less feasible for blue-collar 
laborers whose bodies are literally worn out.180 These are just two ways 
in which national laws and initiatives may have different impacts on 
working-class and rural families, impacts that policy-makers may fail to 
see. We need a practice, like that implemented in some Australian and 
New Zealand contexts, to “rural-proof” the laws and policies we imple-
                                                                                                                       
WELFARE REFORM 77, 83, 87 (Bruce A. Weber et al. eds., 2002); see also WILLIAM P. O’HARE, 
CARSEY INST., THE FORGOTTEN FIFTH: CHILD POVERTY IN RURAL AMERICA 14 (2009), available at 
http://www.carseyinstitute.unh.edu/publications/Report-OHare-ForgottenFifth.pdf (reporting that in 
“2007, only 66 percent of rural children were living in married-couple households compared with 70 
percent of urban children. In 2008, urban children still had a higher likelihood than rural children of 
living in a married-couple family”); Sabrina Tavernise & Robert Gebeloff, Once Rare in Rural 
America, Divorce Is Changing the Face of Its Families, N.Y. TIMES, March 24, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/24/us/24divorce.html?_r=1&hpw (reporting rural Americans as 
likely to be divorced as city dwellers). 
 177. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 42 (Chapter 2, “One Sick Child Away from Being Fired”). 
 178. Id. at 12 (discussing the 2003 New York Times Magazine article, The Opt-Out Revolu-
tion). 
 179. See SHERMAN, supra note 4, at 185 (discussing the irony of workfare); Lisa R. Pruitt, 
Missing the Mark: Welfare Reform and Rural Poverty, 10 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 439 (2007) 
(analyzing the difficulties of implementing welfare reform in rural communities); BRUCE A. WEBER, 
GREG J. DUNCAN & LESLIE A. WHITENER, RURAL DIMENSIONS OF WELFARE REFORM (2002), avail-
able at http://research.upjohn.org/up_press/162/. 
 180. BAGEANT, supra note 4, at 59 (describing the physical impacts of hard work on the work-
ing class: “He’s been worked half to death, crippled up, then bled for every remaining penny by 
doctors and lawyers. In other words, he’s your average older working factory guy these days.”); 
SHERMAN, supra note 4, at 68–69 (discussing the disability situation among timber workers in Gol-
den Valley); John Leland, Retiring Later is Hard Road for Laborers, N Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2010, at 
A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/13/us/13aging.html?scp=3&sq=labor%20ohio%2
0pain&st=cse (describing the physical consequences of manual labor on those who do it over a 
working lifetime). 
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ment.181 That is, we need to not only consider what laws might be most 
beneficial to rural residents, but we should also vet national legislation to 
determine the impact it will have on rural populations in particular. 
To be clear, reaching out to these families need not mean capitulat-
ing to their aspiration for a male breadwinner model and other trappings 
of the traditional family.182 Indeed, these are trappings which fewer and 
fewer rural and working-class families currently enjoy.183 Rather, reach-
ing out means looking for common ground (a topic I address in the next 
Part) and finding ways to meet their needs for child care, transportation, 
education, and other types of infrastructure and services associated with 
well-being and economic growth. 
Both Williams and Sherman are pragmatic in addressing issues of 
politics and policy-making. Sherman suggests that “failure to recognize 
the importance of moral values to rural poor populations can sty-
mie . . . the success of poverty alleviation policies.”184 She further con-
tends that policies “will often fall short of the mark when they do not 
anticipate the ways in which moral and cultural understandings affect 
geographic mobility, poverty survival strategies, and gender roles.”185 
Alienating rural voters is bad for our country both because it 
thwarts formation of a coalition that could deliver more progressive poli-
cies to close the inequality gap and because it renders rural people an 
unsympathetic and seemingly undeserving constituency. Recall Frank 
                                                     
 181. See PARLIAMENT OF VICTORIA, RURAL & REG’L COMM., INQUIRY INTO THE EXTENT AND 
NATURE OF DISADVANTAGE AND INEQUITY IN RURAL & REGIONAL VICTORIA, at xviii (2010) (re-
commending “that the State Government establish an independent rural proofing advisory body with 
an ongoing role to monitor and review legislation, government policy, practices and resources allo-
cation as it has an impact on rural and regional Victorians and in order to ensure that government 
legislation and policy reflects and responds to the diverse needs of rural and regional Victorians”); 
see also PARLIAMENT OF VICTORIA, RURAL & REG’L COMM., INQUIRY INTO REGIONAL CENTRES OF 
THE FUTURE, STATE OF VICTORIA 83 (2009) (describing New Zealand’s practice of rural-proofing as 
“a process for taking into account the circumstances and needs of the rural community (rural people 
and rural businesses) when developing and implementing policy” and noting that “[a]ccording to this 
New Zealand model, in addition to the effects of low population density and isolation, regional and 
rural diversity and dynamism need to be taken into account when considering the implications of 
proposed policies”). 
 182. But see Gowri Ramachandran, Confronting Difference and Finding Common Ground, 34 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 725, 727–30 (2011) (querying the wisdom of endorsing working-class cultural 
norms, which could prove ruinous for families and might be “a recipe for lasting, gendered subordi-
nation that lingers long after formal equality is achieved”). 
 183. See generally SMITH, supra note 134 (comparing rural and urban women’s employment, 
education levels, and fiscal prospects). As Smith observes, urban mothers are in a better position 
financially to join the opt-out revolution than are their rural counterparts because their households 
benefit from higher levels of other sources of income. Id. at 13 (noting that college-educated rural 
mothers have on average $39,028 in other family income, while their urban counterparts have access 
to 50% more other family income—about $60,000). 
 184. SHERMAN, supra note 4, at 24. 
 185. Id. 
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Rich’s characterization of rural residents as “aflame with grievances and 
awash in self-pity as the country . . . leaves [them] behind,”186 while Mi-
chael Katz calls them undeserving of broadband infrastructure—the very 
type of public investment that could alleviate some rural job woes—
because they are “environmentally hostile, energy inefficient and even 
weak in innovation . . . .”187 Ouch! Surely rural residents—no less than 
their urban counterparts—deserve some minimum, adequate level of in-
frastructure and core government services. They are, after all, stewards 
of the vast majority of our nation’s land. They also provide the labor to 
grow our food, extract natural resources, and care for many of the recrea-
tional venues we value.188 Finally, they are disproportionately 
represented among those who fight our wars.189 
IV. MAKING AMENDS: WORK AS A BRIDGE TO SOMEWHERE 
Joan Williams “gets class,”190 as she well demonstrates in Reshap-
ing the Work-Family Debate: Why Men and Class Matter. Williams calls 
on social progressives to recognize our class privilege, just as we have 
recognized race, gender, religion, sexuality, and other sources of identity 
as bases of privilege. She points out some of the material consequences 
of class privilege—higher test scores, better colleges, more secure work-
ing lives191—and she also demonstrates how and why class matters to 
any of a range of social issues that are important to progressives, includ-
ing those related to the work-family conundrum facing many American 
adults. 
Williams implores us to reach out to the white working class, and 
she notes that this will require us to be a whole lot nicer than we’ve been 
lately. New York Times columnist Charles Blow, for one, recently 
summed up the left’s view of the white working class as “hollow, dim 
                                                     
 186. Rich, supra note 24. 
 187. Berkes, supra note 81; see also Klein, supra note 81; Klein, infra note 189 (expressing 
public resentment about farm and other rural subsidies). 
 188. I note that David Brooks’s recent musings about how inexplicable Montanans’ political 
views are came after he vacationed there, something he apparently does regularly. See Brooks & 
Collins, supra note 26. 
 189. See Ezra Klein, Vilsack: ‘I took it as a slam on rural America,’ N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 2011, 
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 191. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 165 (offering this example: “Free spirits not born into money 
cannot count on the second and third chances granted to free spirits born elite. A joy ride by a prep 
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14 (2003). 
810 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 34:767 
and mean,”192 while Thomas Frank has referred to the “madness and de-
lusion”193 of rural Americans for being taken in by conservatives. These 
comments are consistent with Joe Bageant’s characterization of how lib-
erals view working-class whites: “[A]ngry, warmongering bigots, happy 
pawns of the American empire . . . .”194 But Bageant also bothers to ask, 
if the characterization is accurate, why are working-class Americans this 
way? Joan Williams explores this question too, as did Barack Obama in 
the context of Bittergate. The broad answer seems to be that cultural, 
economic, and historical forces have shaped their views, as has a power-
ful desire to differentiate themselves from those who are (or whom they 
perceive to be) less disciplined, less hard working, and therefore less mo-
rally upstanding. More recently, the left’s condescension has aggravated 
white workers’ sense of alienation. 
Williams’s call for us to be less judgmental of the white working 
class is a point on which people as diverse as Barack Obama, Jennifer 
Sherman,195 and Joe Bageant agree. Williams and Sherman reach this 
conclusion as academics studying a phenomenon. Perhaps Barack Ob-
ama, like Joe Bageant, understands it because he is a class migrant—and 
one with considerable personal exposure to the white working class.196 
Have progressives achieved what they desire if they build them-
selves up by denigrating others? I am reminded of Angela Harris’s ex-
hortation in the context of critical race feminism: “[W]holeness and 
commonality are acts of will and creativity, rather than passive discov-
                                                     
 192. Blow, supra note 89. 
 193. THOMAS FRANK, WHAT’S THE MATTER WITH KANSAS? 10 (2004), quoted in WILLIAMS, 
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 196. See supra note 64. 
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ery.”197 It’s not going to happen if we don’t work at it. Finally, we need 
to be civil and respectful not only because it will help advance an agree-
able political agenda, but because it’s the right thing to do.198 
Williams urges us to learn about life in the Missing Middle,199 but 
we also need to learn more about life in rural America. The old saying 
holds that familiarity breeds contempt, but in the case of rural Ameri-
cans—as with the working class more broadly—a lack of familiarity may 
be the culprit. We liberal elites—many of us admittedly what David 
Brooks calls “coastal haute bourgeoisie”—have become so metrocentric 
that we cannot see our rural counterparts.200 We do not know or will not 
acknowledge, for example, that some rural Americans hunt to feed their 
families, not to “eviscerat[e] animals for fun.”201 We cannot or will not 
see the harsh lived realities of dual-earner families who subsist on 
$30,000 a year, of middle-aged citizens who plan to retire solely on their 
Social Security income, or of elderly Americans who already get by that 
way.202 As Williams so thoroughly documents, we have made these 
people the butt of our jokes. More recently, we have relegated those in 
rural America to “nobody” status. 
In spite of their alienation, however, some of these rural and work-
ing-class voters are up for grabs. Many swing voters among the white 
working class (including rural residents) helped Obama win the White 
House in 2008. In 2010, however, they took their proverbial toys and 
went home, reverting to their status as “Republicans by default.”203 We 
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need them back, but we will not get them back by name-calling or eye-
rolling. 
Beyond making nice—and indeed an aspect of doing so—liberal 
elites need to find common ground with the white working class.204 I 
suggest that work itself could constitute just that. Currently, one point of 
misunderstanding between social progressives and the working class re-
gards work. The sources that Williams marshals suggest that the profes-
sional-managerial class associate white workers with laziness.205 What 
else, we may tend to think, would explain their failure to succeed and 
thrive? After all, they have had the benefit of white privilege. 
But a critical insight of Williams’s assessment of the white working 
class is her recognition of the centrality of work to working-class identi-
ty. She understands its critical link to morality and, therefore, its role as a 
basis for distinguishing among white workers. Professor Delgado takes 
Williams’s discussion of the white working class to mean that they are 
not “proud” of their work and thus are different from the professional-
managerial class in a way that represents an intractable conflict.206 I, 
however, read Williams—and view working-class workers—differently 
than Professor Delgado. While the working class may not find their work 
to be particularly fulfilling,207 they are nevertheless proud of it. More 
precisely, they are proud that they do work—proud of their status as 
workers. In this sense, they share what Williams calls “work devotion”208 
with professionals and managers. But the working class are devoted to 
work as a means to an end—supporting their families, paying the bills, 
surviving—not because it is particularly enjoyable or fulfilling, while the 
latter is an aspiration of the professional-managerial class. Work is a 
source of pride for workers, even if they take for granted the details of 
what they do, e.g., shop fitter versus auto mechanic versus administrative 
assistant versus retail clerk.209 Work is a source of identity for them even 
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if they do not discuss its details at social events.210 Indeed, as the very 
label we give them suggests, the working class are defined by work. 
Thus, a first step toward the dignity and recognition we owe the working 
class is an acknowledgement that they work—and they work hard. 
The working class are not struggling because they are lazy or mo-
rally deficient—nor vice versa. The fact that they have less education 
than we do does not mean they are less intelligent than us. (Have you 
never worked with an administrative assistant who was so intelligent and 
motivated that you knew, in a different life, she would be your peer—
maybe even your boss?) Many class migrants attribute their success to a 
combination of luck and hard work. Socially progressive ones who are 
white will probably acknowledge the role of white privilege, too. Their 
attitude toward the working class (including extended family and friends 
or acquaintances from their prior lives) is well captured in a Southern 
expression that credits divine intervention for their good fortune: “There 
but for the grace of God go I . . . .”211 
Bageant expresses white working-class “failures” in relation to 
structural barriers and culture, “[J]ust like black and Latino ghetto dwel-
lers, poor and laboring whites live within a dead-end social construction 
that all but guarantees failure.”212 Barack Obama has also recognized the 
white perspective on privilege and work: “[A]s far as they’re concerned, 
no one handed them anything. They built it from scratch. They’ve 
worked hard all their lives . . . .”213 Once we recognize that the myth of 
white working-class laziness is just that—a myth—we may find that 
work itself is a bridge of understanding, a bridge to somewhere. After all, 
both the working class and well-educated social progressives are, in ad-
mittedly different ways, defined by their work. 
Williams laments that reform-minded progressives have pitted 
themselves against the working class. I do, too, and I also regret the pit-
ting of rural and small-town interests and culture against the metropolitan 
                                                                                                                       
is related not to their perceptions of the quality of family life but to their workplace success. Non-
elite men are more likely to view jobs as a way to provide for their families . . . .” Id. at 185. 
 210. Id. at 185–86 (noting that working-class folks don’t talk about their work in social situa-
tions; they do not, for example, make small talk around questions such as “what do you do?”). 
 211. Of course, some class migrants take more personal credit for their class ascension. This 
attitude may explain the politics of people like John Boehner, Speaker of the U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives. Boehner is a white class migrant who, as a Republican, endorses small government and 
personal responsibility. See Jennifer Steinhauer & Carl Hulse, Boehner’s Path to Power Began in 
Small-Town Ohio, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/15/us/politics/ 
15boehner.html?scp=1&sq=john%20boehner%20ohio%20bar%20class%20small&st=cse. This 
stance suggests that Boehner takes the lion’s share of credit for his success, perhaps overlooking the 
ways in which he has benefited from government. He may therefore assume that others are equally 
capable of class migration. 
 212. BAGEANT, supra note 4, at 9. 
 213. Obama, supra note 153. 
814 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 34:767 
hegemony. As Nate Silver commented in 2009 in relation to the rural 
vote, “[I]f you are going to pit big cities against small towns, it is proba-
bly a mistake to end up on the rural side of the ledger.”214 This is surely 
true regarding both the rural–urban alignment of the culture wars and the 
material consequences of those culture wars for American politics and 
policy-making. 
Bageant urges us to reach out to the white working class, and he 
reminds us what is at stake: 
The fact is that liberals and working people need each other to 
survive the growing economic calamity delivered to us by the re-
gime that promised to “run this country like a business.” Sooner or 
later . . . the left must genuinely connect face-to-face with Ameri-
cans who do not necessarily share all of their priorities, and espe-
cially with Americans who have not been voting, if the left is ever 
to be relevant again to working America. If the left is not about 
class equity, what is it about?215 
Likewise, Williams calls us to “treat[] people who think differently with 
respect”216 as a step toward expanding the progressive coalition. This 
mission is no less important or urgent with respect to workers in rural 
America than it is with respect to the broader working class. 
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